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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a discussion about new reproductive technologies and the 
ethical implications of those technologies. Until now, fetal personhood was the 
focus of pro-choice and pro-life groups battling about abortion versus women's 
rights. However, new reproductive technologies such as in vitro fertilization and 
cryopreservation further complicate the foundation upon which traditional abortion 
arguments are based. The focus of the argument should be shifted from fetal 
personhood to a more comprehensive argument for the respect of the sanctity of 
human life. This shift would force society to address the more crucial issues which 
have led us to abortion and new reproductive technologies - reproductive 
irresponsibility. Six contributors to the area of abortion and new reproductive 
technologies are reviewed in order to establish the state of the arguments. I 
conclude that the sanctity of human life and sexual responsibility is a better focal 
point for the ethical discussion of new reproductive technologies.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a society where everything is treated as a commodity. A society 
where such commodities include human beings. Imagine no more. We live in a 
society which does buy, sell, and dispose of human beings much like a 
commodity such as oranges. Through the use of new reproductive 
technologies infertile individuals are now able to conceive children; however, 
these procedures require the storage and disposal of sperm, eggs and 
embryos. Each of these reproductive by-products can be either used by the 
genetic provider or can be sold to someone else who is unable to produce their 
own functioning reproductive by-products. If these by-products are not used 
within a predetermined amount of time they are disposed of. Reproductive by­
products are also disposed of in other ways such as aborting the embryo/fetus 
or failure to implant an embryo during in vitro fertilization. Now with the 
Increasing possibility of cloning human beings the by-products of those 
experiments would also be rendered a commodity; bought, sold, or disposed. Is 
this a society which respects human life? Or is this a society of individuals who 
respect their own desires and rights without regard for the consequences? It 
has become evident that in this age of technology, which caters to just about 
any desire and to those who fight for those desires in the name of rights, that our 
society as a whole will even dispose of other human beings to effect individual 
preferences. More and more rights outweigh responsibilities and this
1
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imbalance has manifested itself in the realm of human reproduction.
Fetal Personhood Revisited
The moral status of the unborn is not a new controversy created in the 
twentieth century; rather the question has been pondered and prescribed for 
since before Aristotelian times. Yet the fervor generated by this issue is truly a 
creation of this century, in particular the past two decades. Determining when 
the unborn becomes "human" has become a futile exercise among opposing 
groups. Pro-life factions argue that life begins at conception, making any acts 
against the unborn immoral. The pro-life view maintains "that a fertilized human 
ovum is a human being, with a right to life, like, any other human being." 
(Steinbock 46) This view is derived from the fact that a fetus is genetically 
human, like any cell in a human body. The pro-life argument further contends 
that the fertilized egg carries all the chromosomes necessary to develop the 
human body. "Fertilization thus marks the spatiotemporal beginning of a new 
human being." (46) Pro-choice factions argue that although they agree that 
fetuses are genetically human, they are not necessarily "persons" deserving of 
a moral status. Several factors determine the status of an individual such as 
"possession of certain psychological and cognitive capacities, including 
consciousness, self-consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, and 
language." All of these capacities are not necessary for personhood, but 
possessing none of these denies that status entirely. "So, a fetus, at least in 
early or midgestation, is clearly not a person." (52) Scientists have claimed to 
discover when the DNA unique to humans enters into the pre-embryo; three 
days after conception, the zygote divides into sixteen cells (the morula stage); 
on day four the embryo (or blastocyst) enters the uterus; near the end of the first
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week the embryo burrows into the uterine wall; thereby pushing the beginning 
of human life between the third and seventh day from conception when the DNA 
enters the pre-embryo. (Rensberger 8F) Although the beginning of human life 
may be proved scientifically, these groups will never agree on the moral or 
theological beginning of life and/or the status of the fetus.
Test Tube Babies and More
An interesting new twist to these arguments is the issue of reproductive 
technologies. Individuals who are infertile may now be able to have children by 
reproducing in the lab. This involves either the sperm being placed into a 
woman artificially, the fertilized egg being placed into the womb artificially or, 
an embryo placed into the womb artificially; or any of the aforementioned 
combinations placed into a surrogate womb. The technology of in vitro 
fertilization, or test-tube babies, became successful in 1978 with the birth of 
Louise Brown. In vitro fertilization requires that the sperm fertilize the egg in a 
petri dish, upon which the fertilized egg is then placed into the womb. (De 
Marco ix) Prior to the successful advent of the cryopreservation of embryos, the 
above procedures could only be performed within a matter of hours of extracting 
the reproductive cells from the woman. In the situation where married 
heterosexual couples participate in artificial insemination, husbands would 
essentially be "on-call" ready to donate sperm when their wife was ovulating in 
hopes of fertilizing at least one egg. Now embryos, as well as sperm and eggs, 
may be stored indefinitely, but the success rate of thawing embryos is low. In 
1984 the first “frozen embryo baby" was bom in Australia. The mother had 
produced eleven eggs during a procedure known as hyperovulation. Ten of the 
eggs were fertilized; three were lost in unsuccessful implantation attempts;
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seven were frozen. "Of these seven, one was rejected as unsuitable, and four 
did not survive the freezing. The remaining two were implanted: one survived," 
and was delivered. (102-103) Legal battles have already been waged and 
decided in custody cases involving surrogacy with the infamous Baby M case, 
and another where a couple divorced after placing their embryos in 
cryopreservation. Issues of sperm and egg selling are not new to the 
reproductive war, but the selling of embryos has become an issue recently. 
Should human reproductive cells be considered a commodity open for sale in 
the free market? In considering when "life" begins some contend the sale of 
reproductive cells would be a form of prebom slavery.
Society must face up to the ethical issues involved in making decisions 
about the fate of the unborn. When beliefs are inconsistent from one situation to 
the next, beliefs become contradictory and irrational. A sound moral consensus 
does not exist on which to base public policy at this point in time. An ethic must 
be arrived at that encompasses all the variables associated with issues of the 
unborn and the born. An examination of philosophies and laws regarding the 
unborn is necessary in order to understand the current attitudes regarding the 
moral status of the unborn. Society needs to take responsibility for the 
reproduction of its children rather than just their birth or demise.
Discussion at Hand
This thesis is a discussion about new reproductive technologies. The 
inclusion of discussions regarding abortion and artificial contraception is 
necessary in order to bring consistency into arguments regarding any intrusion 
in the natural reproductive process. (The terms new reproductive technologies, 
NRT’s and artificial reproduction will be used interchangeably, and considered
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synonymous; as will contraception and artificial contraception.) Some people 
believe that abortion is a violation of human life whereas the procedure of in 
vitro fertilization is not. others believe vice versa. This type of apparent 
contradiction is indicative of the state of arguments as to when life begins and is 
worth protecting. People often arbitrarily assign rights to either women or the 
fetus when arguing for or against abortion or artificial reproduction; pitting one 
against the other. This only further complicates the issue, leaving little hope for 
consensus. Should fetal rights preempt womens' rights? Should women 
continue to be able to dictate how they conceive and what is done with their 
unborn children? Should scientists and doctors be able to continue 
experimenting with the creation of human life? Should our government leaders 
and representatives determine the fate of human reproduction? Should a forum 
be established where experts and lay persons alike discuss the future of 
reproductive policies? These questions will be explored in hopes of offering at 
least a direction for opposing parties to follow. It is imperative that we as a 
nation clearly understand the short- and long-term implications of our actions in 
the area of reproduction. The goal of this thesis is to help focus the issues for 
deliberation about policies for family welfare and human reproduction.
The thesis is divided into six chapters covering historical, technological, 
legal and empirical and ethical aspects of artificial reproduction. Chapter two 
discusses the various reproductive technologies. In this chapter the differences 
between assisted and artificial reproduction are established. Detailed 
definitions of each of the procedures and how they affect both men and women 
are provided. Chapter three provides a detailed history of atsortion. This 
chapter is necessary to establish the current opposition between right-to-life 
and right-to-choice groups which generate many of the arguments about
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artificial reproduction. The development of the abortion debate and subsequent 
Supreme Court rulings provide insight to the fervor behind the internal battle 
between women and their fetuses and society. Chapter four incorporates the 
opinions of four published contributors to the debates on abortion and artificial 
reproduction. Janice Raymond represents the radical feminist view which 
supports abortion, but not artificial reproduction. Laurence Tribe represents the 
legal community which carefully dissects the laws governing abortion and the 
Implications of artificial reproduction. David Heyd represents the academic 
community offering theories based primarily on moral philosophy. The Vatican 
represents the Roman Catholic Church's view that any intrusion to procreation 
is unnatural and should be condemned and outlawed. Chapter five explores 
the struggle between fetal personhood and rights. The four contributors 
mentioned above are included to demonstrate the diverse beliefs about how the 
fetus should be classified. In addition, Ronald Dworkin's view that the focus on 
fetal rights should be redirected to the sanctity of human life in general is 
reviewed. This chapter establishes the direction of my argument that the life of 
a fetus should be regarded more as human and less as a commodity. In 
chapter six, my argument develops the idea that many individuals are being 
irresponsible in their sexual and reproductive habits. This is evident in their 
careless planning and their reckless "need" for children. I utilize Mary Ann 
Glendon's argument about individual rights rhetoric eclipsing individual 
responsibility to show that if our society were less concerned with what I call the 
"l-me-myself” obsession, then individuals would be more likely to be more 
responsible about reproduction. Chapter seven details my concluding 
proposals about our government working together with its citizens to forge a 
policy that favors the natural progression of life and which encourages
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individuals to be more responsible through programs and facilities providing 
better reproductive education and care for families.
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CHAPTER 2 
NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Advances in technology have been awe inspiring, thought provoking, 
and feared. Many place blind faith in the expertise of scientists, doctors and the 
like without questioning their discoveries, while others do nothing but question 
the technologies and their creators. Advances in human reproductive 
technologies are such an example. Earlier, notions of procreation occurring 
anywhere other than through natural sexual intercourse were left to science- 
fiction writers, myths, and religious miracles. However, now it is possible for 
humans to reproduce who were previously infertile. The types of procedures 
are numerous and complicated, as well as costly to the individual’s physical 
and mental health and bank account. Whether such procedures are "assisted 
reproduction” or "artificial reproduction" is confusing in and of itself. The goal 
here Is to provide a clarification of the categories of the procedures, a history of 
reproductive technologies, and descriptions of what the procedures are and 
how the procedures affect the participating individuals and society.
Assisted vs. Artificial
Confusing as it may seem there is a difference between assisted 
reproduction and artificial reproduction, and so between the physical and 
ethical/moral consequences of the procedures employed in these two cases.
In assisted reproduction the sperm "retains its own capacity for
movement and travels through its naturally appointed course." (De Marco 210}
8
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The egg. though, may be positioned through a medical procedure enabling the 
sperm to be better able to fertilize it. This procedure is known as Low Tubal 
Ovum Transfer (LTOT). This procedure is for women whose fallopian tubes are 
absent, blocked, damaged, or diseased. "In essence, it relocates the egg, 
bypassing or circumventing the area of tubal pathology, in order to situate it in 
an environment where fertilization might possibly occur." (211) This procedure 
was accepted as assisted reproduction because it does occur naturally, in vivo, 
and neither the sperm nor the embryo is manipulated outside of the body. 
Although it is not recorded that the Vatican approved of this procedure, in 1983 
the Archbishop of Cincinnati, Daniel E. Pilarczyk affirmed LTOT stating that it "is 
in accord with the Church’s teaching.” (De Marco 213) Unfortunately, after 23 
months of LTOT’s, not one of the approximately 40 women became pregnant. 
(214) Since 1988, it has neither been recorded nor publicized that LTOT or any 
other-named same procedure has produced a successful pregnancy. The key 
to assisted reproduction is that no part of the insemination process occur 
outside of the body.
The majority of the other reproductive procedures ever recorded and 
highly publicized fall under the category of artificial reproduction. They are 
considered artificial when "the sperm is transported outside of the woman’s 
body along a path not established by nature, and directed into her body by 
mechanical means. Thus, the motive force and the route are artificial and not 
natural.” (De Marco 210) Once the doctors directing the LTOT’s determined this 
procedure ineffective, they modified it to Tubal Ovum Transfer (TOT). Although 
the name intimates the procedure is almost identical to LTOT, the TOT 
procedure is radically different from that of LTOT. TOT does not offer women 
with damaged fallopian tubes any hope of becoming pregnant because the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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environment where possible fertilization is to take place is in the highest 
possible region of the fallopian tubes. In addition, both the egg and the sperm 
must be taken outside of the body. The fine line is that the man and woman still 
engage in sexual intercourse, but the sperm is collected in a sheath which is 
taken and processed outside of the body, then returned via catheter which is 
inserted into the fallopian tube. Air bubbles are in the tube ahead of the sperm 
so that immediate fertilization does not occur "outside" of the body. Unlike 
LTOT, TOT has been successful; the first baby was bom in 1986 only two weeks 
premature. (215) However, since some portion of the insemination occurs 
outside of the body and mechanically, it is considered artificial rather than 
assisted. This distinction is imperative when judging the physical, mental, 
monetary, and moral consequences. The procedure itself is more time 
consuming and costly to the individuals involved [figures are not available; this 
assumption is being made based on other medical procedures - the more 
complex the more expensive]. The acronymie similarity confused many medical 
professionals and theologians leading them to believe that this was assisted 
reproduction, technically and morally equivalent to LTOT, and that if the Church 
approved of LTOT then it must also approve of TOT, but it did not. Archbishop 
Pilarczyk did not give his approval to TOT. (De Marco 216-217)
There is disagreement as to what technologies should be considered 
assisted or artificial. As with many debates, the procedures are dissected and 
placed under a microscope to determine their category, and why or why not, 
they should be morally acceptable. In the arena of debate, reproductive 
technologies are relatively new.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Louise Brown, born July 25, 1978
It seems ironic that five years after one of the most controversial Supreme 
Court decisions giving near, but not absolute freedom to women to abort their 
unwanted children, the birth of a "test-tube" baby would be surrounded by 
enthusiasm by pro-choice advocates equal to that for the Roe v. Wade decision. 
Now some individuals are discovering new ways to create life rather than to 
terminate it.
Artificial insemination is centuries old, with the first documented cases on 
animals having occurred in 1322. There was one incident in 222 a.o. where a 
rabbi discussed in an ancient Talmudic document the possibility of a woman 
having become pregnant by way of semen In her bath water. The first 
documented practice of artificial insemination in humans was in 1799 in 
England. In 1866, it was recorded that Dr. J. Marion Sims was providing 
artificial insemination in the United States. He is also credited with having 
established the practice of keeping the identity of the semen donor and 
recipient classified. Since then artificial insemination has become a commercial 
success with over 172,000 women in 1988 alone seeking the services of clinics 
and sperm banks. (Freedman 23-24) However, with the popularity and ease of 
artificial insemination came the problems as well. Not all women were able to 
conceive even with the assistance of donated sperm. Artificial insemination 
coupled with advances in medical technology created a demand for more 
specialized procedures which would aid even the most infertile in conceiving a 
child.
On July 25,1978 the first baby was bom from in vitro fertilization. The 
media pronounced it a medical miracle - even a miracle baby. What the media 
neglected to inform the public about was all of the failures preceding the birth of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Louise. Doctors Steptoe and Edwards provided the figures to the Royal 
College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists. They estimated that "over a period of 
twelve years they discarded 99.5% of the ova fertilized in their laboratory.
These embryos had been judged unfit for reasons as various as obvious 
abnormality or development beyond the optimum stage for implantation in the 
uterus.” More specifically, sixty-eight women underwent laparoscopy to retrieve 
their eggs, forty-four produced appropriately mature eggs, "of which thirty-two 
were fertilized, and four were successfully implanted, resulting in two live births. 
Louise Brown was bom in July 1978," and Alastair Montgomery in January 
1979. (De Marco 99) It seems they wanted the first bom child of the test-tube to 
be flawless so that infertile couples as well as society in general would not 
reject in vitro fertilization as a Frankenstein-type procedure. As a result in vitro 
fertilization clinics joined the ranks of clinics providing artificial insemination. By 
1981 the United States had two hundred in vitro fertilization clinics, with some 
people estimating that by 1990 every city would have such a clinic. (100) The 
low success rate spawned another procedure. Hyper-ovulation or ovulation- 
inducing drugs were needed to increase the number of eggs a woman would 
produce each month. The low success rate was linked to the fact that women 
produce only one fertilizable egg each month. In some cases women would 
produce up to twenty eggs per cycle under the influence of these drugs. With 
the increased number of eggs to fertilize came the increased number of 
embryos which could not all be implanted at the same time. So hyper-ovulation 
created a need for the storage of these eggs and embryos. Cryopreservation is 
the freezing of reproductive cells for future use. (De Marco 101-102)
Several other procedures have been developed to assist infertile 
individuals in conceiving a child. Infertility clinics are in abundance around the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
world, each specializing in certain procedures. Knowledge, at least a working- 
knowledge, of what these procedures are is necessary to understand the depth 
of the legal and ethical/moral dilemmas that reproductive technologies create.
What are the Procedures?
There are a wide variety of procedures available to aid infertile 
Individuals in conceiving children. Each infertility clinic offers treatments which 
they believe to be the best catalyst to conception. After perusing various clinics’ 
web sites in the internet, it was discovered that some procedures appear to be 
similar, but are named differently. Here the most commonly and consistently 
named procedures found in books, magazines, and web sites will be defined. 
These may only represent a handful of the aggregate available procedures, but 
for the purpose of this study they are a good representation of reproductive 
technologies.
Artificial insemination (Al). The introduction of semen into a woman’s 
reproductive tract by mechanical means for the purpose of conception. 
AID; artificial insemination using the sperm of a man other than the 
woman’s husband. AIM; artificial insemination using the sperm of the 
woman’s husband.
Assisted Hatching. A supplement to standard I VF. A patient goes 
through all of the routine steps of I VF, including ovarian hyperstimulation, 
transvaginal oocyte retrieval and embryo transfer. However, on the third 
day of embryo culture, approximately four hours before embryo transfer, 
a small hole is made in the zona pellucida to help the embryo "break out” 
of the shell, ultimately hatch, and implant on the mother’s uterine wall.
Cryopreservation. Storage of reproductive materials-sperm, eggs, 
embryos-at very low temperatures (-200®F), for later thawing and use. 
Semen or sperm is generally frozen and preserved in liquid nitrogen at 
minus 196.5"C. Freezing embryos is done at the two-, four-, or eight-cell 
stage of development since earlier-stage embryos are more difficult to 
freeze and later-stage embryos are too advanced to develop normally 
after thawing.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Egg (Oocyte) Retrieval. A transvaginal ultrasound guided retrieval 
technique. A needle, guided by ultrasound picture, is passed through the 
vaginal wall and into the follicles (sac of fluid containing eggs). The fluid 
is aspirated and taken for identification.
Embryo Adoption. Unlike egg adoption or artificial insemination, 
refers to a situation where the embryo has genes from neither parent; if a 
woman has an ovarian or tubal problem and the husband is sterile, 
another woman is voluntarily inseminated by the sperm of a donor, and 
once fertilized, the embryo is flushed out after five days and implanted 
into the wife for normal maturation and birth.
Embryo Transfer (ET). The transfer to a woman’s womb of an embryo 
(actually a pre-embryo) to which she did not contribute the egg. The pre­
embryo may have been retrieved from another woman or may have been 
developed in vitro. An artificial embryonation describes the process 
whereby the couple utilize a fertile woman who agrees to be inseminated 
with the man’s sperm; four or five days after fertilization, the physician 
flushes out the embryo and implants it into the wife who will then carry 
the baby to term.
GIFT (Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer). A variation on in vitro fertilization 
in which eggs are retrieved and mixed with sperm, and the mixture is 
reintroduced into the fallopian tube for fertilization there rather than 
outside the body, as in in vitro fertilization.
ICS I (Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection). Utilizes microscopic technology 
for joining eggs and sperm to encourage fertilization. One sperm is 
Injected through the egg membrane into the cytoplasm of the egg.
In Vitro Fertilization (IVF). Fertilization of eggs outside the woman’s 
body, generally for subsequent implantation in the uterus. The Latin term 
“in vitro" literally means “in glass," referring to the fact that in I VF sperm 
and egg are usually brought together in a glass petri dish. Generally a 
physician performs a minor operation on the woman In order to remove 
an egg or oocyte from her ovary by inserting a small needle into the egg 
follicle, and then places the egg in a shallow tube or “test-tube” 
containing the sperm and special medium. For several days, the 
fertilized egg remains In Incubation in the environment simulating the 
womb, and when it reaches the eight-cell embryo, or blastocyst, stage, 
coinciding with the normal time of implantation, the physician Implants 
the fertilized egg or embryo back into the uterus of the mother.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In Vivo Fertilization. From Latin, literally “in body." referring to 
processes going on inside the body. Coital intercourse. Also used for 
embryo transfer or embryo donation after uterine lavage. The donor 
woman is artificially inseminated with the sperm from a husband of an 
infertile woman; after five or six days, the embryo is removed from the 
donor woman in a nonsurgical procedure, and the embryo is transferred 
Into the uterus of the infertile woman.
Laparoscopy. A surgical procedure carried out under general 
anesthesia to examine the pelvic region and'commonly used In 
connection with in vitro fertilization to retrieve eggs from a woman’s 
ovaries. Two incisions are made in the abdomen, one for a tube through 
which cariDon dioxide is pumped to distend the atxfomen, the other for a 
laparoscope (a fiberoptic telescope) and other instruments, which allow 
examination and the aspiration of eggs.
Ovarian Hyperstimulatlon. Normally a woman develops one egg per 
monthly cycle. For I VF, multiple eggs are stimulated to develop 
simultaneously. This super ovulation is accomplished with a series of 
Injections using a combination of drugs; Lupron, for pituitary 
suppression, followed by Metrodin (gonadotropin) for approximately ten 
days. The response to these medications Is monitored by serial 
ultrasound and blood hormone levels. When the parameters Indicate 
that the eggs are mature, a medication called HCG (Human Chorionic 
Gonadotropin) is given, and the egg retrieval procedure is scheduled 
approximately 35 hours later.
FROST (Pronuclear Stage Tubal Transfer). Fertilization of the oocytes 
occurs in vitro; the very young embryo is then transferred Into the 
fallopian tube. (Alpem 347-50; De Marco 100-2 & 219; Freedman 3-11 ; 
The Center for Reproductive Medicine)
Several other procedures exist primarily due to various physicians and 
clinics modifying one of the above procedures, usually in vitro fertilization, in a 
manner which they believe to be the most beneficial to the infertile Indlvldual(s). 
Since there are still many other procedures scientists are developing, futuristic 
notions such as an artificial womb may not be so far Into the future. Most of 
these experiments, though, are performed on laboratory animals, with the leap 
to humans years away. Two in particular made the news In June of 1996.
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Scientists at the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center reported that they have frozen spermatogonial 
stem cells-the cells that make sperm-thawed them and coaxed them back to 
life,” and in a second experiment they have taken stem cells from rats and 
implanted them in mice, which have then produced fully functional rat sperm.” 
(Lemonick 69) This is a medical breakthrough; when sperm is frozen its 
potency is good for a limited amount of time, whereas stem cells could 
theoretically produce sperm forever. "Stem cells also give rise to new stem 
cells, which can then be harvested and frozen in turn,” which can make an 
"Individual male biologically immortal.” It is plausible that any "mammalian 
species could play host to the stem cells of any other,” and If this is adaptable to 
humans, frozen stem cells could become the new fashion In procreation. This 
opens the door for surrogate spermmakers. (69) Medical technology will 
continue to make advances in human reproduction. While scientists work 
miracles In the lab. much like playing God, they leave the consequences of their 
discoveries to the common consumer (it can be argued that is also like playing 
God).
The Costs of Artificial Reproduction
The costs associated with these reproductive technologies affect more 
than the Indlvldual(s) seeking the procedures. Even though the patient Incurs 
hefty monetary, physical and emotional costs, so can the society they live in. 
Family members and coworkers would be affected by any behavioral shifts and 
absenteeism due to the treatments, the legal system and government If the 
patient sues for malpractice or custody of the embryos, society as a whole when 
laws affected by such cases affect dally practices, and society as a whole when
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debating the legality and morality of these procedures is played out in the 
courtroom with taxes paying the costs.
When most individuals discover they are infertile a fight ensues between 
themselves and nature. They are consumed by the thought of not being able to 
conceive and what can be done so they can conceive. Individuals will go into 
debt In order to conceive a child. “A lot of people don't have the money and 
they keep going - people who mortgage the house, couples who haven't been 
out to dinner In three years." (Lee A10) For most of these people it is not a 
matter of just having a child, but having a child of their own (biological). "I was a 
bloodline I wanted to continue. . .  it was my family I wanted to continue. I 
wanted my child to be a biological Jew." (A10) There are no guarantees. In 
some Instances a woman may not even bear a child that Is either her s or her 
husband’s, but that of an embryo donor. The financial costs are high to achieve 
such a goal, but for many couples It Is worth the chance of having a child that Is 
at least half theirs genetically. "The price of a donor egg cycle is comparable to 
adoption, ranging from $14,000 to $20,000, depending on the donor’s fee. legal 
costs and the extent of medical preparation.” (Hoffman A7) Clinics lobby hard 
for egg donors, with rates ranging from $1,500 to $3,000. Some Individuals, 
though, advertise for donors themselves. In The Harvard Crimson in October 
1995 and ad ran which said: "Jewish ovum donor needed for infertile couple 
willing to pay a fee of $3,500 plus expenses.” (A7) In vitro fertilization runs 
about $7,800 a month, which most employers and health Insurers do not cover 
In order to avoid the high costs. As of 1993, "only 10 states have passed laws 
that require Insurers to provide some level of coverage for the treatment of 
Infertility." (Lee A10)
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When a 59-year-old woman gave birth to twins in 1993 via in vitro 
fertilization, the medical community questioned the ethics of such a procedure 
being performed on older women. They questioned whether such a late 
pregnancy is fair to the children, if it is the best use of limited medical resources, 
and “if they pose too high a risk to older women.” (“59-year-old’s..." 1A-3A) The 
death of a baby boy in 1995 turned heads when it was reported that his father 
had beaten to death his 5-week-old son. The father was a 26-year-old bank 
analyst who negotiated with an infertility center to pay a surrogate mother 
$30,000 to be artificially inseminated with his sperm and bear his child. The 
case leaves ethicists blaming the largely unregulated business of surrogacy, 
and industry officials wondering how a single, fertile young man was granted 
what many couples view as a final bid to have children. To most people, 
surrogacy is a last resort To him it was a first resort.” (“Death of baby...” 7A) In 
August of 1996 , “in keeping with a law that has stirred horror and religious 
outrage among some segments of society,” Britain announced that it planned to 
destroy more than 3,000 unclaimed human embryos in fertility clinics. The 
Human Fertilization and Embryology Act became effective on August 1, 1991 
and stipulates that embryos be stored in cryopreservation for a five year time 
limit. The thirty-three clinics at which the embryos are stored launched a ten 
week long mail campaign to the donors warning them of the ensuing 
termination. By law the clinics cannot adopt the eggs or donate them to other 
individuals without the donors' consent. What was troubling is that as many as 
650 couples did not respond, rendering some 3,300 embryos tagged for 
termination. Frozen embryos are regularly destroyed in small numbers, but it 
was this large number of embryos to be destroyed that finally stirred an ethical 
debate. The Vatican newspaper, L’Osservatore Romano, condemned the
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destruction as “prenatal massacre.” The clinics hoped that if the couples did not 
respond to the letters sent to them that the government would at least allow 
them to use the embryos for research or donation. (Ibrahim A1-A4; “British 
Clinics...” A1)
Cases being fought in the courts have reached the bizarre with couples 
fighting clinics and each other for custody of their frozen embryos, the estate of 
a deceased couple possibly being awarded to their frozen embryos, and other 
equally troubling legal battles. These test the resolve of any society. The 
Infamous Baby M case which brought to the forefront the issue of surrogacy 
contracts was just the lid on the can of worms reproductive technologies have 
produced.
How the courts have ruled in cases reflects society's struggle with 
defining the status of embryos, especially in this new environment. In Davis v. 
Davis, a divorce case, it was challenged whether the couples’ frozen embryos 
(seven total after fourteen unsuccessfully implanted) should be listed as 
property as Mr. Davis did under joint property to be divided, or as potential 
persons under a custody dispute as Mrs. Davis listed them. Mr. Davis did not 
want to be forced into fatherhood against his will. Mrs. Davis still wanted to 
attempt the procedure again and insisted that she would not require or request 
any assistance from Mr. Davis. The Tennessee court ruled in 1989 that “life 
begins at conception, and therefore all embryos are human beings and not 
property.” The court gave custody of the seven embryos to Mrs. Davis keeping 
the overriding concern of the best interest of the child. (De Marco 46-7;
Freedman 11) However, in York v. Jones the federal district court of Virginia 
ruled that “the frozen embryo was property belonging to the couple whose 
genetic material created it.” In this case the Yorks lived in Southern California,
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but sought infertility treatments and had their frozen embryos stored at a clinic in 
Norfolk, Virginia. After eleven failed implantations, the Yorks chose to have one 
more embryo frozen and stored. The Yorks decided to move the embryo from 
Virginia to a clinic in California. The clinic refused their request, and the Yorks 
filed a law suit for damages and the immediate release of their frozen embryo. 
The Yorks' concern was tantamount to their embryo having already been frozen 
for twenty-six months and no successful implantation has occurred with 
embryos having been frozen for more than twenty-eight months. The Yorks 
were finally able to move their frozen embryo to California. (De Marco 44-5; 
Freedman 11) In 1981, Mr. and Mrs. Rios of Los Angeles participated in the in 
vitro fertilization program at the Queen's Victoria Medical Center in Melbourne, 
Australia. Mr. Rios agreed to have an anonymous donor's sperm fertilize three 
of his wife's eggs; one was unsuccessfully implanted in Mrs. Rios, and the 
remaining two embryos were frozen. Shortly after, the Rios's were killed in a 
plane crash. The frozen embryos were essentially orphaned. The legal battle 
which ensued pitted the California attorney for the Rios' estate against the State 
of Victoria. The State of Victoria passed an amendment “calling for an attempt 
to have the embryos implanted in a surrogate mother and then placed for 
adoption." Laura Horwitch, Rios estate attorney, “declared that the orphaned 
embryos could not be heirs under California law since Mario Rios was not their 
natural father. Mrs. Rios' eggs had been fertilized by donor sperm.” This was at 
odds with other instances where the consenting husband of a wife whose egg is 
fertilized is considered the father of the embryos, and that it diminished the 
claim by Mrs. Rios's son, from a previous marriage, that he had a right under 
California's law to Mr. Rios's share in the joint estate. The entire case became 
moot when the two frozen embryos were unsuccessfully implanted. (De Marco
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104-5; Freedman 174) Unfortunately, these types of cases will become the 
norrh, and without national laws establishing precedence each case will be 
decided according to each state's laws and governing official’s beliefs.
While controversial legal battles regarding these issues are raging, the 
policies to guide the decisions are not advancing. The United States seems to 
be lagging in forging a national policy regulating reproductive procedures and 
surrogacy contracts. Although the policies themselves may not seem 
comprehensive, other countries have surpassed the United States in 
developing national policies for reproductive technology practices. Australia 
developed national ethical guidelines for in vitro fertilization in 1982 which was 
structured by the National Health and Medical Research Council. One 
guideline places a maximum of ten years on the storage of frozen embryos, and 
the disposition of the embryo should not be determined by the place of storage, 
but that of the individuals whose gametes were used to form the embryo. This 
policy was further strengthened by the Waller Report in 1984 which contended 
that “the rights of the parents in this situation are not absolute, just as the rights 
of parents are limited by the rights and interests of the child, and by the larger 
concerns of the community in which they live." (Freedman 173-74) The Ontario 
(Canada) Reform Commission in 1985 approved storage banks for embryos 
subject to regulation, and the exportation and importation of gametes and 
embryos subject to regulation. The Wamock Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilization and Embryology, structured by the British government in 1982, 
reported in 1984 that it approved “the cryopreservation of embryos under strict 
constraints and subject to monitoring for a fourteen-day period; ten years was 
the maximum allowable time for embryo storage, with the right of disposal 
passing to the storage authority after that time. This was later amended in 1991
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by the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act changing the time limit to five 
years. In 1985, British Parliament passed legislation “outlawing commercial 
surrogate motherhood agencies and setting penalties up to three months' 
imprisonment." (176-77) Such policies, regulations and laws are left to each 
state in the United States to determine. What may be legally acceptable in 
California may not be legal in Oregon.
Many issues surround NRT's, and more frequently authors are beginning 
to address them. The central issues involve the extent to which society should 
intervene in such personal decisions, and consensus is hard to find. As the 
issues are very closely related to those present in the debate over abortion, this 
should be no surprise. In the next chapter I will review the history of the 
abortion debate in this country, demonstrating the complexity of the underlying 
questions.
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CHAPTER 3 
HISTORY OF ABORTION
Before continuing with the discussion of new reproductive technologies, 
it is important that the history of abortion debates be reviewed. This review is 
necessary because the basis of arguments about the new reproductive 
technologies is found in those about abortion. This basis is that of the treatment 
of the unborn, whether the fetus is a person deserving of rights, etc. An 
example of similar arguments is the use of aborted fetuses for research rather 
than being discarded, and the argument about the fate of frozen embryos left 
over from fertility treatments. In addition, establishing that abortion and new 
reproductive technology arguments are essentially the same, it is then 
established that the fetus should be regarded as the same for both issues. With 
a more thorough understanding of abortion arguments the conundrum of new 
reproductive technology arguments will be better navigated.
Throughout history, abortion laws have been enacted to respond to 
concerns among certain groups in society. Since early post-revolutionary 
America, individuals have united to rally for restrictions on abortion practices 
based on their professional and/or personal beliefs. These movements to 
regulate abortion have not always been inspired by medical or religious 
reasons; moreover, the motivations behind these efforts have not always been 
consistent. As society evolved and experienced new cultural changes, beliefs 
regarding abortion practices followed suit. By the time of the Supreme Court
23
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case, Roe v. Wade, and subsequent rulings, society was caught up in a climate 
of rebellion; several counter-cultures were emerging to challenge the 
government and other social institutions, demanding change. The nature of the 
era allowed individuals who were against existing abortion restrictions, and 
who previously did not have a voice in government, to rally effectively.
Eighteenth Century Laws
Early pregnancy abortions in the late 1700’s were not illegal or 
condemned. The law of the Colonies prior to the Revolutionary War and until 
the adoption of the United States Constitution was that of common law.
Common law recognized that abortion was permitted until “quickening", the time 
when movement of the fetus is first detected by pregnant wornen. This time of 
quickening usually occurs at approximately the fourth or fifth month of 
pregnancy. (Tribe 28) Prior to the time of quickening, abortion was not an 
indictable offense. The absence of law concerning pre-quickening abortions 
reveals the fact that the concept of when a fetus is considered “alive” is based 
on beliefs as to when a fetus is considered a human being. The rationale of 
common law allowing pre-quickening abortions arose from a culmination of 
“philosophical, theological, logical, and civil and canon law concepts of when 
life begins." (Doerr 120) For physicians and scientists, before quickening an 
abortion posed little risk to women. For lawyers and judges, before quickening 
no one could prove that a woman was pregnant; therefore, it could not be 
proven whether or not an abortion was performed. (Tribe 28) Christian 
theology and canon law held that a male fetus became “animated” at 40 days, 
and a female at 80 days after conception. This view persisted until the 19th 
century. Although there was little agreement among these groups as to when
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life actually began, prior to the time of quickening a fetus was considered to be 
a part of the mother, unable to survive on its own as an individual. Based on 
this belief, abortion was not considered murder. (Doerr 120) Abortions 
performed after quickening were considered crime under common law, but the 
punishment was not severe -  at most a misdemeanor. (Doerr 121 : Tribe 28)
Nineteenth Century Laws
Statutes regulating abortion were not enacted until 1821, when 
Connecticut passed a law prohibiting abortions induced by the administering of 
poisons. (Tribe 29) At the time the belief was that a small amount of poison 
would only harm the fetus and not the woman. Other “remedies" were available 
to women through their midwives, at local apothecaries with over-the-counter 
herbs and other substances, and through Thomosonian-botanics prescribing 
home remedies -  offering handbooks and clinics to instruct women in the use of 
home techniques. (Petchesky, Rosalind Pollack. Abortion and Woman's 
Choice. Boston: Northeastern University Press. 1990.77. From ABORTION 
AND WOMAN’S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE 
FREEDOM, by Rosalind Pollack Petchesky. Copyright 1984,1990 by Rosalind 
Pollack Petchesky. Reprinted with the permission of Northeastern University 
Press.) Although the mortality rate from unsurgical abortions is not available, 
the rate from surgical abortions was 30 percent. Abortions by “home 
techniques” were indeed not as safe: the state was passing a law to protect the 
health of women, not the fetus. However, by 1840 only eight states had enacted 
any type of law regulating abortion techniques. The Connecticut statute applied 
only to post-quickening abortions, supporting the fact that even at that time, the 
question of when life begins was indeterminate. (Tribe 29)
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The first movement to outlaw abortion was in the mid-1800's, by “regular”
physicians wanting to regulate who could perform abortions. “Regular”
physicians were those who received rigorous training from medical schools, as
opposed to midwives and apothecaries who did not subscribe to the scientific
methods. These regular physicians (who here will be referred to as
“physicians”) sought to regulate abortion procedures. Their motivation was
complex, and it is questionable as to what was their main concern. The
physicians were concerned with the safety of the nonscientific methods of
abortion, and with the legitimacy and consolidation of the medical profession as
well. (Tribe 30) Competition from “medical irregulars” (informally trained
physicians) also arises as a possible reason for the restriction of abortion
practices. Some charged that the physicians' motivation was that of economics,
the desire to monopolize the medical market.
“Doctors as a group” came to discredit the popular health movement and 
midwives by defining their activities as “unladylike” while defining their 
own as technically superior - the “best” care. Doctors worried that, if 
midwives were allowed to deliver the upper classes, women would turn 
to them for treatment of other illnesses and male doctors would lose half 
their clientele. . .  Doctors had to eliminate midwives in order to protect 
the gateway to their whole practice. Widespread abortion and family 
limitation clearly threatened the newfound status (to say nothing of 
potential profit) of male physicians as “attenders” of birth. (Petchesky 81 )
However, physicians' stated motivation was reluctance to perform abortions 
based on their professional code of ethics. Adherence to the Hippocratic oath, 
the oath taken by physicians, prevented physicians from inducing abortions by 
any method. The Oath reads; “I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if 
asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I will not give to a 
woman a pessary to produce abortion," or “I will neither give deadly drug to 
anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly, I will
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not give to a woman an abortive remedy.” (Doerr 120) Physicians were also 
reluctant to adhere to the distinction between quick and non-quick fetuses due 
to their view of "human development as a continuous process rather than a 
sudden event.” (Tribe. Laurence H. Abortion: The C/ash of Absolutes. New 
York; W.W. Norton & Co. 1990. Reprinted with the permission of W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc.)
These various motives and beliefs compelled the physicians to campaign
for the criminalization of abortion. In 1857, Dr. Horatio Storer launched a
movement by the American Medical Association (AMA) to end legal abortion.
The AMA appointed the committee on Criminal Abortion and presented its
report opposing the practice of determining the status of a fetus on the basis of
quickening, and called for physicians to cease in abortion practices. At the
AMA's 1859 convention, the group called for a "general suppression” of
abortions. The committee condemned abortions and cited causes of "this
general demoralization”;
. . .  a wide spread popular ignorance of the true character of the crime - 
a belief, even among mothers themselves, that the fetus is not alive till 
after the period of quickening . . .  the frightful extent of this crime is found 
in the grave defects of our laws, both common and statute, as regards the 
independent and actual existence of the child before birth, as a living 
being. These errors, which are sufficient in most instances to prevent 
conviction, are based, and only based, upon mistaken and exploded 
medical dogmas. With strange inconsistency, the law fully acknowledges 
the foetus in utero and its inherent rights, for civil purposes; while 
personally and as criminally affected, it fails to recognize it, and to its life 
as yet denies protection. (Doerr 122)
For two decades Storer and the AMA campaigned against abortion utilizing the 
media, lobbying techniques, and professional influences focusing on the fetus’ 
right to life. (Tribe 30; Petchesky 79-80) This social movement affected public 
opinion. In 1871, the Committee submitted a report proffering resolutions and
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recommending:
. . .  that it be unlawful and unprofessional for any physician to induce 
abortion or premature labor, without the concurrent opinion of at least 
one respectable consulting physician, and then always with the view to 
the safety of the child - if that be possible. . .  [and that it call] the attention 
of the clergy of all denominations to the perverted views of morality 
entertained by a large class of females - aye, and men also, on this 
important question. (Doerr 122)
By the end of the century over forty antiabortion statutes had been passed 
outlawing abortion for any reason, excepting only the case of "therapeutic” 
abortions. Physicians would perform an abortion if they believed that a 
woman’s health was at stake if the pregnancy was carried to term. Typically 
abortions would be permitted when necessary in the opinion of the physician to 
preserve the life of the woman. (Ten states required the concurrence of a 
second physician.)” (Tribe 34) The physicians now had control of the practice of 
abortion. The decision to abort was taken from women, and given to the 
physician based on "medical judgment.” Therapeutic” was indeed ambiguous, 
allowing for broad and inconsistent interpretations. This law remained 
unchallenged until the mid-1900’s. (34)
The Roman Catholic Position
Although internal debate occurred, the Roman Catholic Church’s position 
on abortion was concurrent with the popular belief that the fetus was not 
considered a human being until the time of quickening. The church did not play 
a role in the early opposition to abortion. In fact, any position taken by the 
church as a whole followed the cue of the physicians. Catholic theology, which 
common law incorporated, hold that a male fetus became "animated” at forty 
days after conception, and a female fetus at eighty days. The discovery of
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fertilization in the nineteenth century marked the change in the church to the 
position that life began at conception. This view was given support by the belief 
in the Immaculate Conception of Mary (which earlier confused some with the 
Church's view that the fetus did not acquire a soul until later in pregnancy) 
which proclaimed Catholic dogma in 1854. However, it was not until 1869 "that 
Pius IX promulgated the papal enactment, Apostolic ace sedis, which 
abandoned the limitation under which excommunication was to be imposed 
only for abortions of ensouled' fetuses." (Tribe 31) Before that time, the Church 
had not excommunicated members for abortion of pre-quickened fetuses. The 
Church's position that abortion was considered murder did not exist until the 
physician's movement to criminalize abortion was well under way in America. 
The Church did not play a major role, nor influence the campaign against 
abortion. The physicians were the forerunners, and in fact they attempted on 
several occasions to seek the aid of the clergy. (Tribe 32; Petchesky 80)
Women’s Early involvement
Early feminist movements did not campaign for abortion rights, rather 
they focused on women's right to "voluntary motherhood" through the practice of 
abstinence. During the mid-nineteenth century, views toward motherhood 
changed due to the urbanization of America, economic factors, rising standards 
of consumption, and ideologies. Women were approaching motherhood more 
"in terms of the care and socialization of children, as opposed to the physical 
bearing of them." (Petchesky 74)
With the growth of the industrial economy, women sought to work outside 
of the home. Although fewer than 5 percent of all white married women were 
members of the work force, the women who did work in factories, on farms, and
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as servants restricted their fertility either by abstinence or abortifacients in order 
to be able to continue providing for their families. In addition, unmarried women 
made up a major percentage of the labor force; thus, they were postponing 
marriage to later years. Women were beginning to experience a freedom they 
had never had before; a destiny not confined to just the home and the bearing 
of children. (Petchesky 74-5; Tribe 33)
Women also believed that the fewer children they had, the better care 
they could give them. The woman's role as a mother in the nineteenth century 
was that of a "socializer” of her children - fulfilling the duty to make good citizens 
of children. "Devotion to the home and to fewer and better' children was now 
considered a divine as well as a natural prescription.” (Petchesky 75) Too 
many children also represented an economic burden. Women had the role of 
motherhood as well as that of a domestic manager. (75)
The feminists viewed a woman’s ability to abstain from sex as the basis 
which set white females apart from both men and immigrant women. The 
number of abortions sought by married middle-class Protestant women 
Increased significantly. The birth rate among these women decreased in 1806 
as compared to those of predominantly Catholic immigrants. Racist fears of 
Immigrant over population compelled the native-born white Protestant women 
to adopt a new ideology regarding procreative rights. (Tribe 32) Women were 
controlling their fertility because they viewed the immigrant women as inferior. 
"For the connotation of sexual purity contained in the ideology of the lady' was 
a distinguishing feature by which white middle-class women were defined, and 
defined themselves, in relation to poor, black and immigrant women. Fewer 
children were evidence of a chaste and spiritual, hence ladylike' life.” 
(Petchesky 76-7)
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Women of the nineteenth century had begun the movement to control 
their reproductive rights. Although the 1900's were expressive of the right to 
abstain, rather than the right to abort, women were finding that they should have 
the ability to determine whether or not, or how many, children they would have.
Early to Mid-twentieth Century Laws
The early 1900's, however, were relatively free of abortion debates. The 
laws, though, did not prevent women from seeking abortions. Although the data 
are not completely reliable, women seemed to have continued to have 
abortions as much as they had before the prohibition of abortions. As many as 
one in three pregnancies was terminated by abortion. The surfacing of "back 
alley” abortions occurred, as well as an increase in "therapeutic” abortions for 
the right price. The more affluent women could seek legal abortions from 
physicians who interpreted the need for an abortion broadly. Therapeutic 
abortions in the 1930's would be performed on women and justified by poverty 
caused by the Great Depression. The 1940's and 1950’s brought on the 
interpretation of "therapeutic” encompassing psychiatric reasons. These legal 
abortions represented only a few of the abortions actually performed during this 
era. The majority of abortions were performed on women who could not afford 
the high price of legal abortions, or the cost of seeking an illegal or international 
abortion. The stories of the deaths and maiming of women who received illegal 
abortions is what served as the major catalyst for abortion law repeal later in the 
century. Few indictments were issued for illegal abortions. In "Minnesota 
between 1911 and 1930 there were only 100 indictments for abortion, and only 
31 of these led to conviction. In Michigan between 1893 and 1932, 156 
indictments for unlawful abortion were handed down, with only 40 resulting in
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conviction.” (Tribe 35) The only punishment widely felt were the incidents of 
underprivileged women who suffered the mutilations or deaths associated with 
illegal abortions.
Laws from the 1950's to the 1970’s
The modem debate on abortion surfaced in the post World War II years. 
The 1950's marked the years of economic boom, as well as the "baby boom". 
Medical technologies advanced, making pregnancy safer to carry to term. The 
availability of legitimately legal abortions decreased. Physicians were finding it 
increasingly difficult to justify abortions on widely interpreted "therapeutic" 
grounds. Hospitals established review boards to decide whether or not an 
abortion was necessary. The number of legal abortions decreased drastically, 
and physicians were now calling for abortion laws to be more explicit as to 
when an abortion was permitted "in order to prevent lawsuits based on differing 
Interpretations of the preservation of the woman's life' language in state 
abortion statutes." (Tribe 35-6) Physicians believed that hospitals were limiting 
abortions based on inconsistent subjective opinions as to when the abortion 
was Imperative. In 1959 the American Law Institute responded by revising its 
Model Penal Code, which one-third of the States ultimately adopted. The 
Model Code stated that an abortion would be permissible when; 1) the 
continuation of pregnancy "would gravely impare the physical or mental health 
of the mother”; 2) the child was likely to be bom with "grave physical or mental 
defects"; or 3) the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. The Code required 
certification by two doctors concurring in opinion. (Tribe 36) The 1960's 
brought wide reexamination of the existing abortion laws. Physicians, who 
previously battled for the criminalization of abortion, were now faced with the
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dilemma of unsafe, illegal abortions and unwanted pregnancies. Although 
carrying pregnancy to term was safer than illegal abortions at that time, 
physicians were steadily becoming more concerned with women's 
psychological condition, as well as the child’s "quality of life" if women did 
continue with a pregnancy.
Two incidents occurred which secured the shift in the physicians’ position 
on abortion laws. In 1962, Sherri Finkbine sought an abortion when she 
learned that a tranquilizer she had taken, thalidomide, resulted in the births of 
children "bom with seal-like flippers instead of arms or with shortened thighs 
and twisted legs.” (Tribe 37) She was permitted to have a legal abortion; 
however, hoping to warn other women of the tragic consequences of 
thalidomide, Sherri told her story to a friend at a newspaper. The article 
resulted in such controversy that the hospital opted not to allow her to have an 
abortion there. Even after a court ruled that she was permitted to have a legal 
abortion in the States, the stigma attached to it forced Sherri to seek an atxsrtion 
in Sweden. This case illustrates the inconsistencies in the use of the power of 
the medical community to determine when an abortion was legitimate under 
criminal abortion laws. (37)
The second case was that of the rutiella outbreak in 1962-65. If a woman 
contracted rubella early in pregnancy, the results were blindness, deafness, 
and severe mental retardation to the child. Some doctors and hospitals 
performed abortions in these instances even though the statutes did not 
explicitly allow abortions for these reasons. A Catholic physician. Dr. James 
McNulty, pressured officials into investigating nine physicians who performed 
such abortions. These physicians were increasingly denying women abortions 
due to fears of prosecution based on the loosely defined abortions laws.
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Doctors were now seeking to liberalize abortion laws. "In 1967 the AMA issued 
a statement favoring liberalization of the abortion laws, and in 1970 it 
recognized the legitimacy of abortion, limited only by the sound clinical 
judgment’ of a physician.” (Tribe 38)
The period between 1967 and 1973 marked the greatest advances 
toward the reform of strict abortion laws. By 1970 twelve states had passed 
liberalized bills, with Colorado, California (reluctantly signed by then Governor 
Ronald Reagan), and North Carolina as the forerunners. These reform laws 
were generally based on the ALI’s revised Model Penal Code. Although these 
laws were enacted to give doctors the latitude to make humane exceptions on 
the ground of health, including mental health, women were still being turned 
away. "Two years after the enactment of Colorado’s reform provision, one of the 
statute’s sponsors observed of its poor performance that its effect was that ‘19 of 
every 20 women seeking legal abortions are being turned away.” (Tribe 42-3) 
The laws were not protecting the very individuals whom they were intended to 
protect. Legal abortions were especially unattainable to poorer women. The 
average cost of abortions was between six and seven hundred dollars. Most 
poor women could only afford illegal back-alley abortions; roughly one-third the 
cost of a legal abortion. (Tribe 43)
Women’s Involvement: 1950’s to 1970’s
The decade after the end of World War II found the United States 
experiencing postwar affluence. The economy was booming, men were coming 
home from the war and women were returning to their traditional roles in the 
home. The independence that women previously sought was traded-in for the 
comforts of a male-provided, single income, domesticated home. Women were
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now seeking the life of a "domestic goddess” because, prior to the 1950’s, war 
and economic hardships left them unable to stay at home. Women were 
marrying younger (at the age of twenty). Women who sought careers and were 
not yet married by the age of twenty-five were stigmatized as "old maids” or 
"prudes”. Women prided themselves on their ability to be "the image American 
women portrayed in the mass media during the 1950s. . .  a well-groomed wife 
and mother. She was the American woman; any other kind was an aberration .
.." (Maloy 16) "Leave it to Beaver” served as a role model for the ideal 
American household, and Donna Reed as the ideal woman. Sex was not a 
topic suitable for nice, young, single girls. Such subjects were meant to remain 
behind matrimonially closed doors. However, women were having abortions. 
Statistics are unreliable, though, due to the fact that a majority of those 
abortions were performed illegally. (13-20) "Dr. Albert Kinsey’s 1953 study of 
more than six thousand urban, white, educated women showed that one-fifth to 
one-fourth of their pregnancies had been ended in abortion.” (Maloy 13)
A possible cause of high abortion rates may have been the fact that 
contraceptives were not widely available to young and/or unmarried women.
"As late as 1968, 60 percent of the states had laws restricting the dispersal and 
use of contraceptives.” (Maloy 52) The inability to use contraceptives along with 
the increase of women returning to the work place in the late 1950's and early 
I960’s added to the rising disparity between the desire for reproductive control 
and strict abortion laws. The protected values of the 1950’s were slipping into a 
freer, more reproductively controlled (more explicitly, the birth control pill)
1960’s. (52) Between 1950 and 1970 the percentage of white married women 
who entered the labor force nearly doubled, and college enrollment increased 
57 percent. (Tribe 39) “The 1960 consensus confirmed the trend, reporting that
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more than one-third of women of working age were employed " (Maloy 52) 
Women were not inhibited by the fears their parents had during the 1950’s. The 
I960’s brought war and a multitude of social and counter cultural movements. 
"The youth of the 1960s resoundingly rejected the notion that sexual 
promiscuity was bad. They exclaimed: If it feels good, do it Make love, not 
war. All you need is love." (56) The idea of domestic fulfillment was being 
replaced by intellectual, professional, and sexual freedoms; women were 
becoming, and already had become for the most part, liberated. Women were 
realizing the need for legal and safe abortions. The number of abortions 
reported by the Centers for Disease Control rose steadily from 22,670 in 1969 
to 615,831 in 1973. (Legge 125)
An obstacle that confronted women in the 1960's was the inability to 
openly speak about abortions. The stigma attached to the sexuality that led to 
abortion was still predominant in society. Feminist groups such as the 
Redstockings held "speak-outs” across the country where women would speak 
openly and publicly about their experiences with illegal abortions. In spite of 
this, women were still blocked by the traditional labels. Not until 1967 did a 
turning point in the reproductive choice debate occur. At the national 
conference of the National Organization for Women (NOW), a debate led to the 
acceptance of the "Right of Women to Control their Reproductive Lives" into 
NOW’S Women's Bill of Rights. The movement to reform abortion laws was 
boosted by the women’s movement and the incorporation of feminist theory.
“The idea of repealing abortion laws was consistent with the view that women 
had a right to a legal and safe abortion." (Tribe 44-5)
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Foundation Casas for Roe v. Wads
The first case decided by the Supreme Court which would later affect the 
decision in Roe was Skinner v. Oklahoma. The Oklahoma state statute 
provided for the sterilization of criminals convicted two or more times of "felonies 
involving moral turpitude." (Tribe 93) In 1942, the Court invalidated this statute 
based on the right-of-privacy to reproduce. This landmark decision was based 
on the right to reproduce as being “one of the basic civil rights of man", and “the 
grotesque disempowerment that could occur if the choice of whether to beget a 
child were transferred from the individual to the state.” (Tribe 93)
The second case to lay the foundation for the ruling in Roe was that of 
Griswold v. Connecticut. In 1965, the Supreme Court struck down a law which 
prohibited married couples from using contraceptives. Justice White wrote in 
his opinion that the “Connecticut anticontraceptive law failed to serve the 
purposes that state's lawyers claimed for it (deterring illicit sexual relationships) 
and impermissibly deprived married persons of ‘litserty without due process of 
law'.” (Tribe 94)
In 1972, the Supreme Court addressed a Massachusetts law in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird that made contraceptives more difficult for unmarried people 
to obtain than married people. Justice Brennan, in writing for the majority 
opinion to overturn the criminal conviction at issue, indicated that whether an 
individual is single or married they should be free to make the decision of 
having children free from government intrusion. (Tribe 94)
The thrust behind Griswold and Eisenstadt was about the right not to 
have children. This right could be vindicated without need for contraception if 
people could refrain from sexual intercourse.
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Roe V. Wade
The Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade was the most 
controversial since their decision in Brown v. Board of Education. (Legge 120) 
The Court found that the right to privacy included the decision to abort within the 
first trimester of pregnancy. Beyond the first trimester, the state had the authority 
to determine where an abortion was performed and by whom. They also ruled 
that a fetus was not considered a “person” as protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment until it reached the point of viability. The Court did not address the 
question of “when life begins.” but viability was the time when the fetus was 
recognized as a “person” capable of living outside of the mother's womb. The 
Court maintained that an abortion could be procured after the twenty-fourth 
week of pregnancy in order to preserve the life and health of the woman. (121 )
The decision was not unanimous; two justices. Justice White and Justice 
Rehnquist, dissented stating that the ruling was an “improvident and 
extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review which the Constitution 
extends to this Court.” (Legge 121) The Roman Catholic Church was also 
outraged. The Church maintained that life begins at conception, and that 
abortion is never acceptable, even when the life of the woman is in jeopardy. 
(Legge 121)
The impact of the ruling was surprising to individuals on both sides of the 
debate. For the majority of those in favor of liberalized abortion laws, this ruling 
was a victory. The New York Times touched on what the most compelling issue 
was during the past decade, aside from the maternal health of the woman; “The 
problem of access to abortion for minorities and very young women.” (Legge 
122)
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The Court performed a useful historical function by recalling that the spur 
for the initial adoption of state laws banning abortion nearly a century 
ago was the great risk of maternal death involved in the surgical 
procedures then used. Now the risk arises out of perpetuating such 
archaic statutory provisions. The effect of these laws has been to force 
women, especially the young and the poor, to resort to abortion mills 
. instead of expert hospital care when they are determined not to have an 
unwanted child. (Legge 122)
The actual consequences of the Roe decision were yet to be 
experienced. Issues such as health care costs for abortions, pro life opposition, 
freedom of expression, theological opposition, and so on, would soon become 
the major forces driving the modem abortion debate. The issue of whether a 
woman has the right to control her own body had been replaced by a multitude 
of other, difficult questions; such as “when does life begin?”
Challenges to Roe v. Wade
In 1989, the Supreme Court ruled on a case which was the first to truly 
threaten the decision made in Roe v. Wade. Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services was an abortion clinic's challenge to the Missouri abortion law. This 
law includes a “restriction on the performance of abortions in public institutions, 
even when the woman would be paying her own bill; a preamble in the statute 
that declares that "the life of each human being begins at conception'; and a 
regulatory requirement that a number of tests of fetal viability be performed 
when a woman seeking an abortion is believed to be twenty weeks pregnant.” 
(Tribe 20) The appeal of Webster was politically motivated, with William 
Webster, Missouri's attorney general, and the Bush administration urging the 
Court to hear the case. If there was a more beneficial time for pro-life factions to 
possibly see Roe overruled, this was the time. The Court's composition had 
changed with the additions of Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy and Justice
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O’Connor. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices White and Kennedy joined in their 
majority opinion to uphold the Missouri law, stating that “the government has an 
interest in protecting potential humao life not just after viability but throughout 
pregnancy and that that interest is sufficient to permit Missouri’s regulatory 
interference with the exercise of the abortion right.” (22-3) Justice Scalia went 
further, expressing the need to overrule Roe based on his view that abortion is a 
mere special liberty interest - not a right such as freedom to assemble and 
speak, meriting no special protections from government. Of the five Justices 
remaining, four opined to protect the right to choose an abortion. Justices 
Brennan and Marshall joined an opinion written by Justice Blackmun to strike 
down the Missouri law. Justice Stevens wrote his own opinion to strongly 
express his opposition to the law stating that the “viability testing provisions are 
unconstitutionally burdensome.. . ” (23) The swing vote was with Justice 
O’Connor. In her opinion she wrote that the Missouri regulations did not unduly 
burden women's decision whether to have an abortion. While she did vote to 
uphold the statute, she did not conclude that Roe should be overruled. (Tribe 
24) This ruling gave the green-light to each state to develop individual abortion 
laws.
The second case to challenge Roe was the 1992 Supreme Court ruling 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsvlvania v. Casev. The ruling in 
this case mirrored the American public's opinion regarding abortion; it should 
remain legal, but with restrictions. The Pennsylvania law required women 
seeking abortions to adhere to the following regulations:
1. Alx)rtion counseling and a woman's informed consent - requiring
doctors to counsel women on the specifics and risks of abortion; to 
describe and provide materials detailing each stage of fetal 
development; to furnish information on, as well as a list of.
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providers offering “alternatives to abortion”; and to obtain a 
woman’s written consent to an abortion.
2. A waiting period - requiring a woman, after giving her informed 
consent, to wait twenty-four hours before obtaining an abortion.
3. Parental consent - requiring an unmarried woman under the age 
of eighteen to obtain the written consent of at least one parent, or 
alternatively a judge, before having an abortion; also requiring a 
parent to accompany the teenager for abortion counseling.
4. Spousal notificatbn - requiring a married woman to sign a 
statement certifying that she had notified her husband, except 
when the husband is not the father or cannot be located “after 
diligent effort”; if the pregnancy is the result of a “spousal sexual 
assault” that has been reported to police; or if she has reason to 
believe that she faces “bodily injury” as a result of the notification.
5. Reporting and public disclosure requirements - requiring a doctor 
to report to state authorities on each abortion performed, including 
supplying copies of the woman’s informed consent and, if 
applicable, the parental consent or spousal notification. The 
reports were to be open to the public. (Craig 329)
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and White voted to 
uphold the Pennsylvania law, but in addition to overturn Roe outright. Justice 
Blackmun voted to strike all of the restrictions, and Justice Stevens voted to 
uphold the informed consent and reporting requirements but to invalidate 
abortion counseling, the twenty-four hour waiting period, and spousal 
notification. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter issued a joint opinion to 
uphold all the regulations except for spousal notification, and reporting and 
public disclosure of spousal notification. (Craig 327) The ruling not only caused 
skepticism from critics accusing the Court of playing presidential politics in 
attempt to deflate the controversy prior to the 1992 election, but Justice Scalia 
also charged Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter of following “not a 
principle of law. . .  but the principle of Realpolitik.” (328) The opposing factions 
both claimed defeat from the ruling, and charged each other with getting exactly 
what they wanted. Pro-life supporters were angry that Roe was not overruled.
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and pro-choice supporters warned that now "the Court is one vote away from 
reversal of Roe v. Wade" (326)
In Retrospect
In the years both during and following these rulings public 
demonstrations became a mainstay outside of abortion clinics and courts 
hearing abortion related cases. In the past few years the demonstrations have 
turned violent, and the murder and attempted murders of abortion-providing 
doctors have been committed. Abortion clinics have been bombed, and 
doctors, workers, and patients have been harassed. Cases have been heard 
on the regulation of pro life groups demonstrating outside of abortion clinics.
Society is now at the threshold of a controversy which casts a new light 
on the abortion debate. New reproductive technologies offer individuals unable 
to bear children a chance of conceiving a child. Several procedures are 
available to those who choose to afford the cost, monetarily, physically, and 
mentally. However, with these new procedures come the controversies 
associated with each. Should the fetus bear the same rights when facing 
abortion as when undergoing NRT treatments? Should the government 
establish policies protecting the fetus from abortion but not from 
cryopreservation? Unfortunately, there is little continuity of arguments between 
abortion and NRT's as to how the fetus should be treated. More and more 
authors are lending their opinions, beliefs, and philosophies to this troublesome 
idea of fetal rights and personhood. However, their words can sometimes be 
more puzzling than the argument at hand. The following chapter reviews four 
authors' contributions to the issue of new reproductive technologies.
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO NRT LITERATURE
Public Policy regarding artificial reproduction in the United States is not 
settled because, as in the issue of abortion, there is little agreement on what 
ethical principles should underlie it. Authors who discuss the issue start from 
different assumptions, raising the spectre of moral relativism. If such authors 
accept a relativist position themselves, or on the other hand argue without 
taking account of opposing perspectives, we are no closer to a solution. An 
examination of four representative authors will illustrate the problems that I see.
Contributors
While there is a large number of arguments regarding reproductive
technologies, I have chosen to represent the gamut by four authors. Janice
Raymond is a radical feminist who argues in Women as Wombs for the abolition
of new reproductive technologies due to their further victimization of women.
Laurence Tribe is a renowned law professor (and former Supreme Court
Justice nominee) and author of Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes, in which he
explores the implications of overruling Roe v. Wade for reproductive
technologies and the subsequent socioeconomic costs to society. David Heyd
is a professor at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and in his book,
Genethics. he presents a compelling theory on the morality of creating new
people. In the past few decades the Pope has written several encyclicals
detailing the Roman Catholic Church's opposition to abortion, and more
43
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recently, artificial reproduction. The encyclicals written by various Popes since 
the early 1900's will be reviewed in order to establish the foundation for the 
most recent encyclical authored by Pope John Paul II.
Raymond
In her book. Women as Wombs. Janice Raymond argues that the new 
reproductive technologies (NRTs) and surrogacy contracts, among other things, 
further the victimization of women, reducing their already inferior role in society 
to that of mere “incubator” for use by a male dominated society. She 
recommends not just the regulation of NRTs and surrogacy contracts, but the 
abolition of them altogether. Raymond contends that arguments such as hers 
do not “make” women victims, but merely expose the fact that women are still 
victims of male domination. She argues that the so-called choice given by 
these new technologies and contracts is not really a choice at all, but a way for 
men to seize more control over women. Raymond implicates the media in 
aiding men in promoting the propaganda that women need these technologies 
because women need to reproduce, (i-xxix) Raymond believes that the choice 
to seek an abortion is vastly different from what she refers to as “women's right 
to choose unsafe, experimental, and demeaning technologies and contracts." 
(Raymond, Janice G. Women as Wombs. San Francisco; Harper San 
Francisco. 1993. xi. Reprinted with the permission of Janice G. Raymond, Copyright 
1994, Spinifer Press, Melbourne, Australia.) Male-dominant interest in controlling 
women's bodies is evident in the language of surrogate contracts, as well as in the 
language of choice. The choice for women to use NRTs renders women and their 
fetuses as mere products in the market place of reproduction. Raymond asserts that 
this “language of choice makes reproductive consumerism ethical” [i.e., acceptable]
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to those who abuse women, (xii)
She asserts that both media coverage of NRT's excluding or diminishing 
critical commentary and this framework of terminology has empowered men's 
political right of fatherhood “grounded in male gametes and genes.” She labels 
this fatherhood as “ejaculatory fatherhood,” countering that motherhood and 
fatherhood are not founded in the contribution of reproductive parts, but in the 
rare development of parental relationships; that fatherhood does not develop 
until the child is bom, and not in all cases: “motherhood is fundamentally 
relational,” fatherhood is not. (30-39) Raymond claims that society regards 
infertility as a disease and NRT's as therapies which allow “reproductive 
experts” to cover-up the multitude of medical violations such as non-disclosure 
of the consequences of these procedures. She attributes society's acceptance 
of these technologies, regardless of the costs to women, to Western faith in 
medical progress, rendering women dependent on “more and more 
questionable technical solutions.” (14) Raymond asserts that “doctors minimize 
and even censor the brutality of the technologies, the medical casualties, and of 
course the body count.” (xx)
NRT's bring reproductive and sexual politics together where the access 
to and abuse of women's bodies for medical research, financial gain and the 
manipulation of life is taken from the private sphere and cast into the limelight 
where men strengthen their hold on women's imagined reproductive freedom, 
(xxv-xxvi) This creates a “spermatic economy” where men buy women's 
reproductive services for surrogacy similar to that of prostitution and 
pornography. Infertility is the new code word for frigidity in which “technology 
becomes the new instrumental manipulation that will coax women's reluctant 
bodies into reproductive performance . . .  technological reproduction has turned
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medicalized pornography into education, made medicaiized access to the 
female body acceptable, and transformed medicalized abuse into standard 
treatment.” NRT's are not about reproductive freedom for women, but rather 
about the “appropriation of the female body.” (xxxi)
Raymond calls for the emphasis of reproductive politics to be placed on 
"the value of women as ends In themselves, independent of reproductive 
worth.” As NRT's and surrogacy contracts increase, women are viewed as 
means to another's end, and they reinforce the perception that “women have no 
independent intrinsic value” aside from procreating. This ethics of integrity 
would assert that “women are independent, integral beings, not breeders.”
(203) She contends that a policy which only regulates NRT's would not 
embody this ethic, that it would only manage the risks to women rather than 
eliminate them. Raymond argues that the only way for women to stop being 
“technologically ravaged” is by abolishing all NRT's. She believes that such a 
policy will not drive these procedures “underground”, and even if it did, the 
amount of NRT's procured would be minimal. Further, she does not accept that 
such a policy would violate a woman's right to privacy as stated in Roe v. Wade 
and implied in the Fourteenth Amendment. Having the right to privacy does not 
give women the right to “do” with their bodies as they please. Contracting their 
bodies and reproductive cells for monetary gain and acts of altruism would 
establish them as property - a commodity that can be bought and sold 
perpetuating the oppression by male dominated interests. Raymond clearly 
states that regulation of NRT's would only promote oppression of women rather 
than prevent it. (203-209)
Raymond did raise two issues that were reasonable: 1 ) The individuals 
who seek NRT's often bear the burden of defending their choices. Often when a
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case comes to us via the media, we take the side of one party while 
condemning the other. It is as if the roles of "burden of proof have been 
reversed. In a case before a judge the party making the accusation (plaintiff) 
bears the burden of proof against the defendant, but in the public forum where 
individuals are seeking artificial reproductive aid society holds them under tight 
scrutiny requiring the infertile individuals to provide evidence or justification of 
their choice to artificially reproduce. I believe that is due to many of us being 
uneducated to the many nuances of such technologies, therefore, accepting 
what is told to us by the media as "gospel”. It is much easier to become 
involved in the drama of the parties involved and make off-the-cuff judgments 
because it literally requires minimal thought. 2) The right of privacy does not 
mean you can sell your body. If a woman chooses to assist someone else in 
reproduction by renting her body for surrogacy or donating her eggs or embryos 
she can do so by way of a "gift” of her reproductive cells, but not if she sells 
them. The selling of reproductive cells renders human beings as property with 
their reproductive cells as a commodity. This is different from wage labor in that 
when we perform certain tasks at our workplace, we are being paid for a skill 
which does not require removal of any of our body parts, unlike the sale of 
reproductive cells.
However, Raymond asserts that the reason why NRT's should be 
abolished is because it will further the victimization of women, since women are 
unable to make self-determining choices due to there being no real choices 
available to women. Raymond is attempting to project her views of victimization 
on the entire female populace of the world, imposing her belief as the "right” 
one, negating all others. She contends that women are wrongly conditioned to 
believe they have a "need” to reproduce. I disagree. Some women do find
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Child-bearing quite rewarding, and not all women are raised to believe that 
motherhood is their only career choice in life. Maybe four decades ago that was 
the case, but society has evolved, albeit not perfectly but nonetheless we are a 
lot better off than we were. Raymond chooses to portray women as victims, but 
if we allow people like her to continue this rhetoric of victimization we do not 
progress toward a common ground of discourse. In addition, she calls for 
abolition stating that there should not be any fear of these procedures going 
"underground”. However, many abortion opponents argue the same, that if we 
merely criminalize abortion, people will stop getting them. As was evidenced 
before Roe v. Wade and subsequent rulings, women were not deterred by fear 
of the law; many resorted to "back-alley” abortions. If history teaches us 
anything, it is that we should be quite fearful of NRT's going underground with 
no regulation or protection. In regard to her charge that a man cannot become 
a father until after the baby is bom and a relationship is developed, I am 
appalled. If her claim is because only women can "experience” the baby 
growing inside of them, then what becomes of the relationship between parents 
and their adopted children? Are they any less of a child to a parent because the 
mother did not bear it? Being a parent is a commitment of mind and body - not 
biological or inherent, and not confined to a few minutes.
Raymond presented some provocative arguments, but the few arguments 
that were, in my opinion, legitimate were obscured by her anger, presented in 
her constant male-bashing through the use of loaded language. In addition, 
she establishes in her introduction that she does not give equal time to 
opposing arguments, because they are so "dominant, well-known, and widely 
publicized.” (xii) This comment, and subsequent misrepresentation of opposing 
arguments in her book, greatly diminishes the credibility of her own argument.
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resulting in a one-sided diatribe with the use of "scare tactics.” Raymond is not 
concerned with making a contribution to the discussion of artificial reproduction. 
Her arguments and conclusions clearly indicate that it is "my-way-or-the- 
highway”; no room for negotiation. Although I perceive her intent to be that of 
preventing the devaluation of women, her writing makes me feel that she is 
making more of a mandate than a contribution to a discussion among equals.
Tribe
Tribe asserts that in light of such medical advances as surrogate embryo 
transplant, cryopreservation, and such a futuristic idea as artificial wombs, the 
traditional abortion arguments are becoming inconsequential. These types of 
advances would change the face of the abortion debate. He stresses that 
several implications for society need to be contemplated if such medical 
technologies are available, whether abortion is criminalized or not. Tribe states 
that society as a whole needs to determine the socioeconomic effects rather 
than simply the moral effects of these decisions. If Roe were to be overruled, 
such an impact would upset the socioeconomic balance in the United States. 
Outlawing abortion would lead to an increased population of unwanted children 
in the U.S. Even without the new medical technologies, the current foster and 
adoption systems would be unable to handle such an overwhelming increase in 
the number of cases needed to be dealt with. Tribe believes that whether or not 
a fetus is a person, or whether a woman has a right to choose, should not be the 
focal point of these debates - society will never be in agreement on such issues. 
His concern is that society needs to begin determining what is economically 
rather than ethically sound. Essentially, what is actually in the best interest of 
society needs to be determined.
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A fetus is not viable until the twenty-fourth week of gestation. Tribe states 
that some groups argue that technological advances may move this point of 
viability closer to the point of conception, while others argue that since the time 
of Roe such advances have not been realized, and are not likely to be realized. 
However, medical technology currently exists (although not perfected) which 
allows the fetus' theoretical viability to be within five days after fertilization.
Such technology is known as surrogate embryo transfer (SET). "A fertilized 
embryo is removed from one woman's uterus by washing the uterine wall with 
saline solution. The embryo is then transferred directly to a recipient woman's 
uterus by use of a uterine catheter.” (Tribe 222) Another technology is known 
as cryopreservation. in which the embryo can then be taken and frozen until 
needed for implantation. He stresses that this technology may move the point of 
viability back to conception. (222) With the perfection of SET beyond the first 
few days of pregnancy it would be difficult for women to argue the imposition on 
their liberty by not being able to have an abortion (the embryo could just be 
transferred). These current technologies and future advancements certainly 
beg the question of the soundness of the viability stipulation in Roe.
Tribe suggests that such a medical advancement as an artificial womb 
would deprive women their right to choose abortion, "affirming] the special 
value of motherhood by firmly locating the decision to become a mother in the 
woman whose body, mind, and genetic material are at stake. Abortion permits 
her to control her own procreation, to prevent the unconsented-to use of her 
genetic material in the creation of another human being.” (223) Tribe stresses 
that most genetic parents are troubled by the knowledge of an unwanted child 
still living in the world that is a perfect stranger to them, let alone their 
reproductive cells possibly being used to help other couples conceive a child.
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The state should have "no greater authority to preserve the life of a fetus when 
the woman doesn't want a child than to take a woman’s ovum (or, for that 
matter, a man's sperm) and make an embryo of it. Surely the state must be 
forbidden from kidnapping' our chromosomes for its own purposes." (223) He 
contends that the right of individuals to control their "own genetic material may 
be vital in decentralizing control over genetic material in order to prevent an all- 
powerful state from making eugenic decisions (as in Nazi Germany), and vital, 
as well, in affirming the dignity and particularity of human reproduction and 
human relations. . .  Yet when such a right' entails destroying another human 
life, we must surely pause." (223) In addition, by preventing women from 
choosing how or whether to produce a child or not, her womanhood may be 
rendered inconsequential and undistinctive. With SET or artificial wombs 
women’s right to be free of the burden of pregnancy would be vindicated, but 
not "her right to control the use of her genetic material in the creation of a child." 
(224) Based on this view. Tribe argues that women's right to control their own 
genetic material should be fundamental.
Tribe suggests that if such technologies allow women to discontinue their 
pregnancy while still preserving the life of the fetus, then the argument of 
imposition becomes inconsequential. Such easy and safe procedures as SET 
would prevent women from being physically and psychologically molded into a 
mother. If women still choose to destroy the fetus, it would be for extremely 
selfish grounds. (225) Tribe continues, though, that although the abortion 
dilemma would appear to be resolved, society may have a compelling interest 
to prevent the dehumanization of reproduction that could follow if such state 
power were to exist. Here he seems to contradict himself: if genetic parents are 
troubled by the knowledge of their child living with some other family how would
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they not be troubled by the knowledge of their unborn child "living" in some 
freezer? He stated earlier that individuals' right to control their own 
reproductive cells should be fundamental.
If society allowed such medical technologies as SET to replace abortion, 
who, then, would pay for the procedure in order to preserve the fetus? A 
remotely similar procedure, in vitro fertiiization and embryo implantation can 
cost more than forty thousand dollars. Artificial wombs would most certainly be 
more costly. The only medical care given that compares is that of treating 
extremely premature infants. Such life support can cost two to three thousand 
dollars per day. Tribe then tells us that the government must address the 
question of who will carry the fetus to term if we choose not to force the genetic 
mother to do so so as not to impose on her liberty. He suggests that the female 
pro-life supporters might be more than willing to offer their own bodies for this 
service in the name of right-to-life; however, the procedure itself must still be 
paid for by someone. (227) If payments are not made by the genetic or 
surrogate mother, then obviously they must come from the government. The 
socioeconomic cost implications cannot be ignored. One million six hundred 
thousand abortions are performed annually in the United States. The costs to 
society if SET replaced legal abortions would be astronomical. Tribe suggests 
that we as a society and our governing bodies should be more interested in 
creating an environment where fetuses would be wanted by their mothers. The 
largely unsuccessful foster care and adoption systems could not be maintained 
by such an increase of unwanted children. (Tribe 227)
Tribe clearly presents a more clinically academic argument than 
Raymond. On the surface his writing seems without emotion, only facts and well 
thought out premises and conclusions. As he himself stated, he is more
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concerned with the socioeconomic implications rather than the moral 
implications. I find this troubling in that we are human beings chock-full of 
emotions and moral concerns that make us humans and not machines. Society 
cannot exist without morals and values, especially the value which we attach to 
humans, whether they be preborn or bom. In his discussion of government 
controlled eugenics. Tribe in reminiscing about Nazi Germany gets ahead of 
technology and how society will abuse it in offering a slippery slope argument. 
Tribe continues this slippery slope argument in his discussion of how the 
overturning of Roe will effect all of the consequences he described. According 
to Tribe, if abortions were to become illegal, if surrogate embryo transfers and 
such futuristic technologies as artificial wombs are realized, then decisions 
about reproduction will be removed from women and placed solely in the hands 
of the government, resulting in state controlled reproduction. (222-223) Tribe's 
concerns are legitimate, but these results are not definite. Lessons were 
learned from the atrocities committed during the Holocaust. The clear 
difference between what the Nazis did to the Jewish people during the 
Holocaust in trying to cleanse the human race and what people are doing today 
with NRT's and abortion is that the Nazis singled out a specific group of people 
out of hatred and through a propaganda-filled campaign tried to eliminate that 
race with government directives. Rather, NRT's and abortions are not 
performed out of hate. While Aldous Huxley's novel Brave New World provides 
some thought-provoking warnings, we can not automatically forge policy based 
on fears of the possible.
He should take heed of his own concerns about the Holocaust when he 
states that socioeconomic concerns outweigh moral concerns. He seems more 
thoughtful of the society as a whole and the liberty interest of women rather than
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that of the fetus. He does not indicate what he believes the status of the unborn 
to be, only that of the individuals walking on the face of the Earth. Tribe 
suggests that more discourse is needed to consider the socioeconomic costs to 
society. Yet without blatantly stating it. Tribe does take an absolute view when 
he concludes "we need not await any new technology to recognize that any 
system for requiring fetuses to be brought to term when their mothers will not 
raise them separates the gestation of children from their upbringing in ways that 
are difficult to square with our traditions of family life.” (227) I interpret this to say 
that Tribe is absolute in the socioeconomic interests taking precedence over 
any individual interest, born or preborn, and that if a child is to be born in 
anything other than the genetic family, then those children should not be born. 
The problem is that he renders the decision whether or not to terminate a 
pregnancy as a decision similar to whether buying a car will be financially 
smart. Tribe offers as a contribution the concern of the socioeconomic balance, 
nothing more. This is a legitimate concern, but it should not dictate how we 
proceed with discussions on artificial reproduction, let alone abortion.
Heyd
In Genethics. David Heyd introduces us to his theory of the person-affecting 
approach to matters of the unborn. He defines genethics as "the science of creating 
new biological worlds... the theory of moral worldmaking... concerned with ways 
of worldmaking ”. (Heyd, David. Genethics. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
1992. 23. Copyright 1994. Regents of the University of California. Reprinted 
with the permission of University of California Press.) He states that such an 
ethic is needed because everyday moral intuitions and traditional ethical principles 
seem "either to lead us into paradox or to break down altogether when applied
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to genesis problems.” Genesis problems are those which deal with the 
"existence, number, and identity of future people.” Heyd believes that such 
problems cannot be ignored due to their critical nature, but also that they cannot 
be analyzed by "existing moral and theoretical tools.” (23)
Heyd attempts to apply classical philosophies to current reproductive 
issues, showing how they fall short in attempting to guide individuals through 
the muddy waters of reproduction. Rawls was chosen to represent the rights- 
based philosophy; Kant for his duty-based approach; utilitarianism and 
historicism for goal-based conceptions. Heyd concluded that it was almost 
impossible to make these classic frameworks fit into present reproductive 
issues:
Unlike liberal and humanistic expansions of the reference groups (to 
women, children, other races, animals), sensitivity to the lot of future 
people cannot be expressed simply by embracing "them” into the moral 
community. For it is exactly the indeterminacy of "them” which makes it 
impossible to apply contractarian. Kantian, or utilitarian principles to 
decide "their” lot. It is not the assumption of timelessness of the moral 
community which makes theories of ethics incapable of handling 
genesis problems, but rather the paradox of being expected to provide 
ethical principles for membership in the community which is the basis of 
all ethical principles. Right-based theories could not supply any such 
principles, because potential people cannot be said to have a right to be 
bom. Duty-based theories looked a little more promising, but again only 
on the assumption that either there is some moral being to whom such a 
duty is somehow owed (mainly God) or that the duty to procreate is 
derived from a certain goa l. . .  But with goal-based theories we have to 
choose between a person-affecting concept of value, which traps us in 
the same problems as right- and duty-based theories, or settle for an 
impersonal concept of value which is difficult to justify and leads to 
uneasy implications. Basically two altematives seem to suggest 
themselves as a way out of this logical catch: either do away altogether 
with the constraint of justifying moral judgment in terms of deontic 
relations between individuals and the assignment of value to identifiable 
persons, or limit the boundaries of the relevant reference group (the 
individuals who have rights and are the subject of duties and value) to 
actual, existing people. (63-4)
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Heyd continues by telling us that genesis problems are guided 
specifically by human choice. Thus the definition of potential people for the 
purposes of genethics is ‘people whose existence is dependent on human 
choice.” For an embryo or fetus to become potential means that the individuals 
making the decision about the pregnancy must actualize the unborn. If the 
individuals choose to carry the pregnancy to term then the unborn has become 
actual to the decision-maker and is thus a potential person. However, the moral 
status of the unborn, although a potential person now, has no claim to any type 
of rights or liberties because the logical dependence of their existence rests on 
the decision-maker. Heyd argues that due to this the "question of discrimination 
against potential people cannot even arise as they have no moral status of any 
kind, not even a weak one." (99) "If indeed. . .  potential persons have no moral 
status or rights, a person may have a claim for moral consideration on the part 
of oiie person but not on that of another.” (101) Heyd here shows us that 
although one individual may consider the child an actuality, another may only 
be considering it as potentially being an actual person.
Heyd's problem with the concept of becoming a parent is that 
reproductive choices are always "egocentric”, that individuals "use” 
reproduction as a means to their ends. People reproduce for a variety of 
reasons, none of which ever refer to the welfare of the child; "none of these 
motives takes the child as an end in itself.” (108-9) But the child once bom 
cannot make claims based on being born unhappy, not having the same 
options as others, because it has not been done a wrong by being born.
"Coming to life is neither a harm nor a gift.” (109) No one can predict the value 
of a potential person’s life. What may be of value as an adult to one may not be 
of value to another. Heyd contends that the notion of a minimum quality of life is
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borrowed from social theories of distributive justice. The value of life to each 
individual is based on their perception of what makes life worth living. (121)
The notion of even existing is left to the parents; "their interests which are the 
determining factors in the decision whether or not to have children 
(parentocentrism)." (125) However, if the parents do not respect the rights of 
their children once bom. then society must respond to the rights of children. If 
parents are incapable of providing for their children (e g. due to having too 
many children) then society may have to interfere in "the procreative behavior of 
its members." (132) Society is often held responsible for the welfare of children 
when parents do not take care of them. Should there be a "licensing of parents" 
even though parenthood is "usually held to be a natural or universal (and 
unconditional) right”? Heyd stresses that this is not beholden to the future child, 
but because of the burden incurred on society by the "irresponsible 
reproductive behavior of the parents." Many consider the notion of licensing 
natural parents as repugnant, but why then is it acceptable in cases of artificial 
reproduction, surrogacy, and adoption? (157) Heyd challenges the opposition 
to genetic engineering by relating the tampering with genes to what individuals 
do when they buy sperm, eggs, and embryos or contract a surrogate mother 
based on certain characteristics. This is a form of “genetic control over identity 
with no genetic engineering required.” (175)
Heyd concludes by stating that by the "fact of the uncontrolled or 
unplanned birth of people, most future people are actual for us in the sense that 
we believe in the privacy of reproductive decision making, that is, in the far- 
reaching (though not absolute) freedom of individuals to reproduce with no 
state interference. Ethical values make the existence of most future people a 
fact lying beyond the reach of political bargaining of a coordinative or
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distributive kind.” (198)
Based on his discussion, it seems that Heyd chooses to leave 
reproductive regulations untouched. This allows individuals to make various 
decisions at various times depending on various circumstances. Heyd is 
correct in stating that although one individual may perceive the unborn as an 
actual person another individual may not perceive the very same unborn as an 
actual person. Different stimulants trigger different responses in people. Just 
the knowledge of a fetus may not trigger the response that it is an actual person. 
An individual may need more stimuli, such as an ultrasound revealing the fetus 
in the womb, but if the individual does not perceive the fetus as an actual 
person then the pregnancy may not progress to the stage where the fetus is 
visible via ultrasound. Individuals may think this way because other factors are 
preventing them from perceiving the unborn as actual. Possibly the thought of 
becoming a parent, the financial strain, etc.. stirs up enough fear to cause the 
individual to deny the fetus' existence rather than simply not perceiving it as an 
actual person. Just because someone may not perceive it as actual, does not 
diminish the fetus’ existence; the fetus still physically exists in the body 
regardless of what is in the person’s mind. His person-affecting view means 
that one couple can perceive, for example, their frozen embryos as vehicles to a 
potential fetus. However, the frozen embryos that do not implant in the uterus, 
or the frozen embryos that are discarded because they are no longer needed, 
are perceived as non-potential nothings. So, does that mean that a woman 
seeking an abortion can perceive her unborn embryo as a nothing, while 
another woman may perceive her unborn embryo as a something? Heyd’s 
theory does not hold water. Where do you draw the line? Either these embryos 
exist as potential people all the time or they do not at all. I can say that I do not
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perceive Yucca Mountain as an actual threat because I choose to not allow it to 
affect me, but someone else may perceive Yucca Mountain as an actual threat. 
Regardless of how we perceive it. Yucca Mountain and all of that nuclear waste 
still exists somewhere. The person-affecting view can be an excuse for 
individuals not wanting to take responsibility for their reproductive decisions.
An example is if I were to get pregnant right now. and I perceive it as being 
inconvenient to my current situation at home and work I can decide that the 
embryo inside of me does not really exist for me because I will not carry it to 
term. However, if I get pregnant next year and determine that my situation has 
much improved for me then I can decide to perceive the embryo inside of me as 
actually existing because, this time, I will carry it to term. This is a form of moral 
relativism; how I perceive the unborn child relative to my situation will determine 
the fate of the unborn child.
Heyd believes that reproductive decisions should be made privately 
without government intrusion, but if a couple continues to have children and is 
unable to provide for them once bom, then the government should intervene 
and prevent them from having children because it affects society as a whole. I 
interpret this to be discriminatory, not to any specific gender or race, but to the 
less fortunate individuals of the world. Is Heyd saying that anyone can do 
anything about having children just so long as it does not affect the 
socioeconomic balance (similar to Tribe)? What would qualify an individual as 
being a potentially good parent deserving of a license to reproduce? In Skinner 
V. Oklahoma the Supreme Court struck down such a law which stipulated forced 
sterilization on criminals with two or more counts of felonies involving moral 
turpitude. (Tribe 93) We cannot be headed for a society which prevents 
individuals from reproducing if their tax returns show they are on or near the
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poverty line. Someone could have all the money in the world and be a child 
abuser. We need to support the less fortunate people in our society, and help 
them to learn to support themselves so that they do not remain dependent on 
public welfare.
Heyd's person-affecting view does not really contribute much of anything. 
He leaves us no better off than the way society currently is regarding artificial 
reproduction. Heyd believes it to be okay as long as you are a good unselfish 
parent with plenty of money to support your children and both parents perceive 
the unborn as actual and with value. His view does illustrate my point that 
moral relativism can be a terrible principle for reproductive decisions. Moral 
relativism, in his view, justifies allowing individuals to make reproductive 
decisions privately on their own terms. It is bad, though, if less than desirable 
individuals are permitted to reproduce privately when their children come to 
depend on the government for support when they need welfare services or are 
forced to place them in foster care because they abuse them.
Vatican
In the past two centuries the Roman Catholic Church has been 
recognized as an influential voice on contemporary social issues. Moreover, 
the teachings of the Church through publicly issued encyclical letters authored 
by various Popes have created world wide controversies. The most disputed is 
that of the Church’s vehement condemnation of artificial contraception. This 
condemnation by the Church includes the philosophical foundation for the 
Church’s opposition to any form of artificial reproduction, as well as artificial 
contraception and abortion. The most current encyclical written by Pope John 
Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, addresses artificial reproduction, but only briefly. I do
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not believe this is due to the Church’s limited understanding of artificial
reproduction, rather it is because throughout the years the Church has
established its opposition to any interruptions in the natural course of
procreation. The following discussion will present the history of the Church’s
opposition to artificial contraception to reveal the philosophical foundation to its
opposition to artificial reproduction.
On December 31.1931. Pope Pius XI issued the encyclical Casti
Connubii in which he reiterated the Catholic opposition to contraception. He
"applauded elevated notions of conjugal love and parenthood, and explained
that confining conjugal acts to known infertile periods, for right reasons, was
morally permissible. . .  and was not opposed to the Church’s understanding of
natural law." Nonetheless, the condemnation of artificial contraception is
unequivocal, and it was listed first in Casti Connubii that the Church views
contraception as an "evil opposed to the benefits of matrimony." (Smith 4-6)
But no reason, however grave may be put forward by which anything 
intrinsically against nature may become conformable to nature and 
morally good. Since, therefore, the conjugal act is destined primarily by 
nature for the begetting of children, those who in exercising it deliberately 
frustrate its natural power and purpose sin against nature and commit a 
deed which is shameful and intrinsically vicious. (Smith 6-7)
Within the Catholic Church the position taken by Pius XI was virtually 
unchallenged until the mid-1960’s. With the introduction of birth control pills the 
Church began experiencing opposition to its long-standing view of artificial 
contraception.
Pope Paul VI issued his encyclical Humanae Vitae on July 25,1968 to 
reinforce the Church’s position on any contraceptive which interferes with the 
natural progression of life. Humanae Vitae caused an uproar, dividing 
members of the Church. The center of the uproar was the teaching that every
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artificial contraceptive act is intrinsically disordered. Some believe that Paul VI 
meant, when he wrote this, that artificial contraception is either intrinsically 
morally wrong or evil. This put bishops, priests and theologians on the 
defensive, regardless of whether they agreed with the encyclical. The 
Scandinavian bishops issued a statement: “No one should, therefore, on 
account of such diverging opinions alone, be regarded as an inferior Catholic." 
(McCormick 6-10) Dissent within the Church was widespread, but the Vatican 
was to stand firm in its convictions. In 1981, Pope John Paul II reinforced Paul 
VI'S condemnation of contraceptive interventions in his encyclical Familiaris 
Consortia. He defined sexual intercourse as that which “expresses the total 
reciprocal self-giving of husband and wife." Pope John Paul II viewed the use 
of artificial contraceptives as “that of not giving oneself totally to the other." (10) 
By the time John Paul II released this encyclical it had been three years since 
the birth of the first test-tube baby, and almost ten years since the landmark 
decision in Roe v. Wade legalizing abortion. Artificial contraception was not the 
only procedure violating what the Church believes to be the natural 
progression of life.
During the tumultuous years of the I970’s to early I980's, the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith studied and debated the position of 
the Church to these new threats to natural law with various governmental 
committees, religious groups and professional societies on the international 
scale. What resulted was the presentation of the Vatican's Instruction on 
Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation by the 
Doctrine of the Faith in 1987. The Vatican hoped the Instruction would compel 
people to reevaluate their own moral assessment of the new reproductive 
technologies, as well as of abortion and artificial contraception. The Instruction
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unequivocally expressed the Church's position on the respect that must be 
given toward all human life, whether bom or preborn. Through answers to a 
series of questions, the Doctrine of the Faith reinforced the Church's enduring 
position on artificial contraception as incorporating artificial reproduction and 
abortion because all of these interfere with the natural progression of life. In the 
Instruction it was specified that the "human being must be respected -as a 
person - from the very first instant of his existence." and that if "the embryos are 
living, whether viable or not. they must be respected just like any other human 
person; experimentation on embryos which is not directly therapeutic is illicit." 
(Hull 21-24) The Instruction continued to condemn any form of artificial 
reproduction, specifically in vitro fertilization and artificial insemination: "[T]he 
Church remains opposed from the moral point of view to homologous in vitro 
fertilization. Such fertilization is in itself illicit and in opposition to the dignity of 
procreation and of the conjugal union . . .  artificial insemination within marriage 
cannot be admitted except for those cases in which the technical means is not a 
substitute for the conjugal act but serves to facilitate and to help so that the act 
attains its natural purpose." (32) It seems safe to say that the Instruction did little 
to persuade many individuals seeking abortions, artificial reproduction or 
contraception. From the time of the presentation of the Instruction to the present 
day, abortions have increased, even though American laws have become more 
stringent. Artificial reproduction has also boomed, and become quite the 
financial success story for clinics offering these procedures. And contraceptives 
. . .  well, maybe these are not being used quite as much since teenage 
pregnancies are on the rise. But we cannot allow the popularity of these 
procedures to dictate the ethical value of them; the rampant (mis)use of 
abortion and artificial reproduction can be argued to be indicative of a society
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with little regard to what is ethical.
. The recent decades' sexual activities provoked another response from 
Pope John Paul II. He issued his encyclical letter, Evangelium Vitae on March 
30, 1995. The Pope viewed the recent human condition as a phenomenon 
"resulting in the devaluation of human life,” especially "attacks affecting life in its 
earliest and its final stages.” John Paul II barely touches on the issue of artificial 
contraception, in stark contrast to earlier encyclicals. He promotes the "training 
of married couples in responsible procreation” and the use of "natural methods 
of regulating fertility” as well as "the study and spread” of these methods. He 
condemns doctors who perform abortions and artificial reproduction (and 
euthanasia as well) stating that; "Even certain sectors of the medical 
profession, which by its calling is directed to the defense and care of human life, 
are increasingly willing to carry out these acts against the person. In this way 
the very nature of the medical profession is distorted and contradicted, and the 
dignity of those who practice it is degraded.” (Paul II 689) He calls the current 
state of affairs the "culture of death,” in which the value of life undergoes a kind 
of "eclipse”. He charges that this culture is "actively fostered by powerful 
cultural, economic and political currents which encourage an idea of society 
excessively concerned with efficiency.” John Paul II states that individuals 
regard the unborn as a burden merely because of its existence and/or handicap 
because it "compromises the well-being or lifestyle of those who are more 
favored.” He refers to this as the unleashing of the "conspiracy against life.” He 
further charges that prenatal diagnosis only perpetuates this conspiracy 
because it becomes an opportunity for individuals to "therapeutically intervene" 
with the pregnancy if the fetus has any handicaps, limitations or illnesses. John 
Paul II condemns artificial reproduction outright in Evangelium because of the
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high rate of failure, not of fertilization, but of the exposure of the embryo to the 
risk of death. Also he notes that the number of embryos produced exceeds the 
number needed by the woman in order to conceive; therefore, the surplus 
embryos are either destroyed, frozen, or used for research which "reduces 
human life to the level of simple biological material' to be freely disposed of.” 
(690-691) He blames this condition, not on individual situations, but on the 
much larger scale of cultural, social and political levels, "where it reveals its 
more sinister and disturbing aspect in the tendency, ever more widely shared, to 
interpret the above crimes against life as legitimate expressions of individual 
freedom, to be acknowledged and protected as actual rights.” (692)
All of the encyclicals I have read are compelling, thought provoking, 
emotional, and somewhat poetic. Unfortunately, the appeals to emotion often 
cloud my more clear thoughts. I believe this response to be the case for most 
individuals who happen to read these encyclicals or any other religious 
literature. Religion plays an important part in many people's lives, forcing many 
to confront issues of life and death which are highly emotional subjects for most 
whether they consider themselves "religious” or not. These encyclicals provoke 
emotion because they discuss issues which no one really has a definitive 
answer. However, the above encyclicals in their entirety are not just fire and 
brimstone designed to scare the pants off of people. The messages are 
carefully thought out, with legitimate concerns and teachings.
For the most part I find little disagreement with the teachings on abortion 
and artificial reproduction. Pope John Paul II provides valid reasons for the 
Church's condemnation of these two procedures; they are in violation of the 
natural progression of life, and risk the lives of embryos. The Church is very 
absolute in its position on any threat to life, "potential” or existing. This becomes
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a problem in its stance on artificial contraception, which is any contraception 
other than abstinence or cycle-watching. Some forms of contraception, I 
believe, are not morally wrong. While technically they may interfere with the 
natural progression of life, their intent is not to kill an already formed life. Birth 
control pills, condoms, sponges, and similar devices are designed to prevent 
the joining of the egg and sperm. These differ from such contraceptives as 
RU486, essentially an abortion pill, which is taken after conception is achieved. 
The Church believes that the conjugal act between married people is good for 
its unitive aspects as well as the procreative aspects; but not everyone believes 
that the only time a married couple should have sex is to reproduce. Does this 
mean that infertile couples are committing a sin knowing that the only reason 
they are having sex is for mutual intimacy rather than procreation? Not to 
mention that not all couples can financially or emotionally afford a large family. 
Does this mean that they should never have sex in fear of the natural 
contraceptives failing? I think this teaching about the procreative aspect of sex 
has a benefit for those who are not married or prepared to care for children, but 
taken to the degree that the Church takes it denies our ability to rationalize and 
make our own decisions. However, I do agree that tampering with the natural 
progression of life through artificial reproductive means is unnatural and 
devalues human life. It commodifies the value of being able to create new lives. 
Being infertile does not make an individual any less of a person, just infertile. 
Artificial reproduction commodifies life rendering it a high priced item available 
only to those with the means. Artificial reproduction allows people to design 
their own children, families through genetic engineering for the former and 
timing of child-bearing for the latter. Artificial reproduction decreases 
differentiation among the human species, which in turn decreases tolerance for
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those who are bom handicapped, or in any other way less "perfect”.
To Sum Up
These four representatives of the debate on artificial reproduction, 
abortion and contraceptives, offer compelling arguments in support of their 
positions. Unfortunately, if these four representatives were to sit down in a room 
together to discuss a possible solution to the issue they would need interpreters 
to understand each other. All four could contribute valuable insights to the 
debate, but they would need to be willing to make compromises which I do not 
believe they would (except maybe for Heyd if he perceived it as a value to 
himself). The big problem is Raymond and Tribe barely acknowledge the 
importance of the status of the unborn. Raymond is too involved in the rights of 
women over everyone to be concerned with the fetus, but she does intimate that 
fetuses have no rights over women. Tribe is more concemed with the 
socioeconomic balance and the liberty rights of women than that of the fetus. 
Heyd is just too relativistic; how could he possibly ever take a definitive position 
on anything? If a person cannot stand firm behind any conviction, then how can 
they contribute anything to this or any discussion? The Vatican needs to 
recognize that in order for people to recognize the problem with artificial 
reproduction we need to allow them to change their views and practices 
gradually rather than expect a complete turn-around of morals and values 
overnight. If we are to progress to even a mutually working dialogue regarding 
the unbom, we need to be able to put our egos aside to listen and comprehend 
each other’s beliefs. We need to agree to disagree, but to do so constructively 
to attain a higher goal of compromise. I do not believe the above four 
representatives are prepared to do this. They seem to talk past each other.
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pushing their views upon society. What is needed is an outline for the evolution 
of di^ourse regarding the treatment of the unborn (which will be discussed 
later). What most authorities have been writing about are the symptoms of a 
larger problem. A central issue which stands in the way of agreement is the 
status of the unborn. The next chapter examines the different authors' ways of 
handling this, and argues that their differences cannot be resolved by defining 
the conflicting rights which may be involved. Rather, we turn to Ronald 
Dworkin’s suggestion (in discussing abortion) that the focus should shift from 
rights to acknowledging a "sacred dimension of all human life.”
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CHAPTER 5 
FETAL PERSONHOOD & RIGHTS
Should the fetus (embryo, zygote, etc.) be considered a person with full 
rights as protected by the Constitution? If so, at what point during gestation 
does the fetus become a person? Much has been written detailing how and 
when a fetus does or does not become a person, most of it in the debate over 
abortion, but these varying opinions also drive artificial reproduction debates. 
Moreover, adding to the argument of whether a fetus is a person is the issue of 
what rights the fetus has, if any, over its mother. In this chapter I will present a 
brief synopsis of Raymond’s, Tribe’s, Heyd’s, and the Roman Catholic Church’s 
position on the status of the fetus. In addition, a compelling argument which has 
been presented by Ronald Dworkin in Life’s Dominion will be examined.
Dworkin believes that the status of the fetus is not the real issue; what is at issue 
is a general respect for the sanctity of human life and how this translates into 
rights. Aspects of his argument provide a foundation to a greater goal of 
compromise when discussing artificial reproduction.
Opinions About Fetai Personhood & Rights
Janice Raymond believes that people, especially feminists, need to
situate the status of the fetus in relation to the pregnant woman rather than "the
woman in relation to the fetus." (182) She believes that women’s personhood
has been diminished by the religious and political right’s raising the fetus to the
level of a person. She asserts that the fetus “is not a piece of tissue, nor is it
69
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analogous to another bodily organ like an eye or kidney. It is also not a person. 
It/s, however, an integral organism with developing human potential." (182) 
Although it is a developing human being, it cannot develop outside of the 
woman's body. Therefore, the fetus cannot be given away as if it were an organ 
like a kidney. "The relation between a pregnant woman and her fetus is not a 
property or ownership relation . . .  the legal status of the fetus cannot be 
separated from the legal and social status of the pregnant woman in whose 
body it exists, and its existence is not that of personhood, certainly, but rather 
that of possibility.” (182-3) Raymond asserts that most women do not intend to 
devalue or use their fetus for any purpose once it has been aborted, and that 
the fetus should not be used for experimental research. She does not believe 
that the distinction between aborted fetuses as remains, rather than waste, does 
not signify that the fetus should be accorded a ceremonial burial as would an 
already born individual, but that they "remain unused"; no more, no less. 
Raymond fears that if fetal tissue is used for research that they, too, would be 
"devalued and objectified for their use value in the same way that other parts 
and products of women's bodies, such as uteri and eggs, are externalized, 
used, and commodified.” (183) She believes that the onslaught of fetal rights is 
not only due to the activism of the religious and political right, but also is a 
reaction against the “reproductive liberals who promote the development and 
access to invasive new reproductive technologies." (65) Raymond concludes 
that the focus should be returned to that of the pregnant woman as the primary 
patient rather than that of the fetus as primary patient.
Laurence Tribe believes that the liberty interests of women seeking 
abortions should not be compromised by any possible legal rights of a fetus, 
even though the abortion is prior to the time of viability. He asserts that if
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fetuses were recognized by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution as a 
separate person that the ramifications would be far reaching. “One result would 
likely be the reversal in significant part of the Supreme Court’s long line of 
contraception decisions." (122) This is due in part to the fact that some 
contraceptives such as lUD’s and some birth control pills do not prevent 
conception, but rather implantation. This would deprive the fetus of its liberty 
interest of life. In addition, he predicts the use of in vitro fertilization would have 
to be banned because the procedure inevitably results in the destruction of 
several fertilized ova. “As a consequence, the birth of a wanted baby will 
remain out of reach for countless infertile couples for whom in vitro fertilization 
offers the only realistic hope." (124) Furthermore, Tribe states that giving 
fetuses the status of a person would require government control of the uterine 
environment; thus imposing undue restrictions on pregnant women. Such 
technologies as SET may be required by the state to fulfill its obligation to 
protect the liberty interests of the fetus by transferring the fetus to a less 
hazardous womb. Tribe argues that such a stipulation would render a woman’s 
option to effectively parent prior to birth meaningless, thus diminishing her 
natural role as a mother. “Treating the fetus as a person would therefore mean 
the beginning of the end of an individual woman’s right to bear and then give 
birth to-indeed, to form emotionally important parental bonds with-her own 
child." (125)
David Heyd believes that the unborn child does not have moral status or 
rights because it is only a potential person. Heyd stresses that although a 
parent may choose to have the child, thus making it a potential person, that 
unborn child only exists because the parent chooses for it to exist and has no 
rights to be bom a certain way. The unborn child becomes actual only in the
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sense that it does exist in the physical sense. Otherwise, the unborn child does 
not become an actual human being with rights until it is bom. (101,240) Heyd 
argues that genetic engineering is not against the unbom child's best interest 
because the unbom child has no interests of its own. The examination of the 
unbom child through genetic screening can alert the physicians and parents of 
any potentially handicapping agents thus allowing for genetic intervention or 
termination of the pregnancy. "This method is more controversial since some 
people regard it as a violation of the sanctity of human life ..." (169) Heyd 
believes that arguments against genetic engineering based on its 
"unnaturalness” are inadequate because children have no right to be born 
genetically unique. The identity of a child is not actual until it is bom, and is not 
altered by changing the color of its eyes. (255) The child has rights only once it 
has been bom, and then it has only the right not to be harmed from then on. It 
has no right against its parent[s] for being bom unhappy or handicapped. (115) 
“Coming to life is neither a harm nor a gift." (109)
The Roman Catholic Church's position is unequivocally that conception 
marks the beginning of human life deserving of all the protections accorded 
born children. Pope John Paul II denounces the current culture that 
characterizes offenses against the unbom as within the limits of human rights.
He stresses, "the very right to life is being denied or trampled upon, especially 
at the more significant moments of existence; the moment of birth . . . ” (692) He 
charges that society has become a collective of autonomous individuals where 
"everyone else is considered an enemy from whom one has to defend oneself." 
(693) It is this self interest that becomes a "right" in the face of a strong majority. 
The Pope feels that the state is no longer a "common home" for all to live 
together equally, and has become a place where it creates the right to "dispose
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of the life of the weakest and most defenseless members,” rather than 
protecting “the first of the fundamental rights, the right to life.” (693) He 
approves of prenatal screening only when it harbors no risk either to the mother 
or the child, and only when it is "to make possible early therapy or even to favor 
a serene and informed acceptance of the child not yet bom . . . "  (694) However, 
he condemns it when used to expose any anomalies in order to prevent the 
birth of the child. The killing of innocent human creatures, even if carried out to 
help others, constitutes an absolutely unacceptable act." (694)
Four compelling opinions on the status of the fetus and its rights. 
Raymond, Tribe and Heyd accord to the fetus no status and argue that all rights 
remain with the mother. It is no surprise that the Roman Catholic Church 
believes the fetus is a human being from the time of conception and should be 
treated as such. Raymond believes abortion is justifiable, but artificial 
reproduction is not; Tribe wavers between the two because it depends on who 
is going to foot the bill in order to preserve the life of the fetus; Heyd in that it 
depends on how a person is affected by all of this. In order to come to a 
consensus on this question they should not focus on rights, as this has been the 
stumbling block in abortion debates. Rather, a different perspective on 
discussing our respect for the unborn is needed. Ronald Dworkin offers his 
contribution by way of repositioning the argument of the status of the fetus 
altogether. He believes that it is really an argument about the sanctity of human 
life, and if everyone realized this then compromise would be more attainable.
Life’s Dominion
Ronald Dworkin has an altemative approach to the issue of fetal 
personhood. In his book. Life's Dominion. Dworkin addresses the much heated
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debates over abortion and euthanasia. Although his discussion about the 
status of the fetus is focused on abortion, the premises of his argument are such 
that they would apply to my study of artificial reproduction. Dworkin establishes 
that it is not important to determine whether a fetus is a person because the term 
"person" embodies many uses and meanings. He argues that the true debate 
lies in the widely held but unrecognized belief that human life is sacred in itself.
He believes that due to the rhetoric of rights the general public has failed 
to recognize the true grounds of arguments about abortion. The wide use of 
such rhetoric has furthered the polarization of opposing groups. There is no 
possible way they could ever compromise about abortion. He argues that most 
people “do not have grand theories about the metaphysical premise of their 
opinions about abortion." (Dworkin, Ronald. Life's Dominion: An Argument 
AlDout Abortion, Euthanasia, And Individual Freedom. New York: Vintage 
Books. 1994. 20. Reprinted with the permission of Random House, Inc.)
Dworkin believes that everyone is confused about the actual character of the 
disagreement. He states that if both sides were to better understand the nature 
of the argument, then everyone could reach an agreement that would be 
acceptable.
He begins by establishing the difference between two types of objections 
to abortion. The first is that abortion is wrong in principle because it “violates 
someone’s right not to be killed, just as killing an adult is normally wrong 
because it violates the adult’s right not to be killed.” (11 ) This type of objection 
is what he calls derivative “because it presupposes and is derived from rights 
and interests that it assumes all human beings, including fetuses, have.” (11) 
Individuals who offer this objection believe that life begins at conception and the 
fetus has rights and interests of its own, and ought not to be aborted from that
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time on. (21) The second objection to abortion is “that human life has an 
intrinsic, innate value; that human life is sacred just in itself; and that the sacred 
nature of a human life begins when its biological life begins.” not when the fetus 
begins to move or has sensation or begins to have any rights or interests. 
Dworkin calls this type of objection detached because it does not presuppose 
rights or interests. (11 ) Individuals who propose this objection believe that from 
the moment of conception a “fetus embodies a form of human life which is 
sacred.” (21)
Dworkin argues that these two differing groups would agree that abortion 
is always morally wrong, but that because they disagree about whether or not a 
fetus is a full person with rights they will continue to become entangled in the 
rhetoric with which they attack each other. However, based on public opinion 
polls regarding abortion and when it should be prohibited, he infers that most 
people would agree that “a fetus is a living, growing human creature and that it 
is intrinsically a bad thing . . .  when human life at any stage is deliberately 
extinguished.” (13) He continues that his somewhat “unorthodox view of the 
abortion controversy” would satisfy both sides. Dworkin claims that if people 
“share a profound conviction that it is intrinsically wrong deliberately to end a 
human life. . .  [then] it is perfectly consistent to hold that view. . .  and yet believe 
that a decision whether to end human life in early pregnancy must nevertheless 
be left to the pregnant woman, the person whose conscience is most directly 
connected to the choice and who has the greatest stake in it.” (15) He stresses 
that if people believe that human life is intrinsically sacred and that the abortion 
battles are really about the “cosmic value of human life” then these battles have 
a “quasi-religious nature” and therefore government should not interfere with 
procreative choices. (15)
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Dworkin continues by attempting to establish when a fetus could become
a person with interests by exploring the physical development of a fetus. He
states that it is indeed against the interests of the fetus to be subjected to pain,
but a fetus does not feel pain until late in the pregnancy.
True, electrical brain activity arises in a fetus's brain stem, and it is 
capable of reflex movement, by approximately the seventh week after 
conception. But there is no ground for supposing that pain is possible 
before a connection is made between the fetus's thalamus, into which 
peripheral nerve receptors flow, and its developing neocortex; and 
though the timing of that connection is still uncertain, it almost certainly 
takes place after mid-gestation. These thalamic fibers do not begin to 
form synapses with cortical neurons until some later time, moreover, 
which has been estimated to be at about twenty-five weeks. (17)
Dworkin cites embryologists as stating that twenty-six weeks is a good marker 
for fetal sentience, when all elements are present and working and that a fetus 
could survive outside of its mother's womb, and abortions should not be 
performed after that time. He stresses that if a fetus is not capable of having 
interests then an argument based on abortion being against a fetus's interests 
is illogical. “Whether abortion is against the interests of a fetus must depend on 
whether the fetus itself has interests at the time the abortion is performed, not 
whether interests will develop if no abortion takes place.” (19)
He continues by exploring how liberals and conservatives view abortion 
in order to establish how they perceive the status of a fetus. Dworkin shows us 
that although conservatives profess not to have a tolerant view about abortions, 
in some cases they do allow that some exceptions should be made. When the 
mother's life is at stake and the only way to save her life is to abort her fetus 
then this should be permitted. Also, abortion should be permitted when the 
pregnancy is the result of rape or incest. These three exceptions seem to 
contradict the conservative view that a fetus has rights and an interest in living.
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To allow these exceptions still means that the fetus does not have any interests 
or rights. On the other side. Dworkin shows us the liberal position has four 
parts. (Dworkin exempts the view that abortion is never morally problematic 
and is a mere surgical procedure because he believes that most, if not all 
women perceive abortion as a grave moral decision.) The first part of the liberal 
position holds that a woman should never abort her fetus for frivolous reasons 
such as that her pregnancy would prevent her from traveling to Europe or that 
she has discovered that her unbom child is a girl and she would rather have a 
boy. Second, abortion is justified when it is necessary to save the life of the 
mother, if the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest, and in cases of severe 
fetal deformity because it would be morally wrong to bring such a handicapped 
child into the world. Third, if the pregnancy, if allowed to continue, would force 
the woman to leave school or give up a chance of having a satisfying career 
and independent life. Fourth, that until fetal viability the government has no 
business interfering with the pregnancy even if the abortion is morally 
unjustifiable. (33) All of these suggest that the fetus does not have interests of 
its own, but also that the decision to abort is a serious moral decision. Dworkin 
establishes that both liberal and conservative views “presuppose that human 
life itself has intrinsic moral significance, so that it is in principle wrong to 
terminate a life even when no one's interests are at stake." (34)
The next question Dworkin tackles is: “What does it mean to say that 
human life is intrinsically important?” He tells us that something is intrinsically 
valuable when its value is independent of what people feel they want or need; it 
is valuable in and of itself. He continues by determining the difference between 
how people value things. He states that people value things in two different 
ways: incrementally and sacredly. Things that are incrementally valued are
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when people believe the more of those things exist the better. Things that are 
sacred are those which are valued because of their existence; as with works of 
fine art or cultures. (72-4) He shows us that while some things can be 
incrementally and sacredly valued, such as knowledge, we do not value human 
life that way. We do not necessarily demand that we have more and more 
human life because we do not value it incrementally, rather we value it as 
sacred. The hallmark of the sacred as distinct from the incrementally valuable 
is that the sacred is intrinsically valuable because-and therefore only once--it 
exists. It is inviolable because of what it represents or embodies. It is not 
important that there be more people. But once a human life has begun, it is very 
important that it flourish and not be wasted.” (73-4) Dworkin further establishes 
what makes something sacred. He states that something is sacred when its 
“deliberate destruction would dishonor what ought to be honored.” But how did 
human life become sacred? He argues that people view life as sacred because 
it is the result of the creative process, because most people believe that “the 
evolutionary process is quite literally creative, for they believe that God is the 
author of nature.” (74) But even those people who do not believe that God is 
the author of nature, but instead believe in the Darwinian process of evolution, 
do so utilizing “artistic metaphors of creation.” Dworkin goes on to show 
examples of various groups of people who view life in general as a creative 
process, and how extinction of any type or aspect of life would be in essence 
sacrilegious.
People with either of these views—the conventionally religious one or 
some version of the idea that nature itself is purposive-believe that 
destroying a species is wrong because it wastes an important and 
creative achievement of God or the procréant world. We regret the waste 
of a creative investment not just for what we do not have, but because of 
the special badness of great effort frustrated. (79)
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He is careful to point out that not everyone believes in some supernatural force 
guiding our existence. These people do believe, though, that it is wrong for 
human beings to destroy what has been naturally created. “When they say that 
the extinction of a species is a waste of nature's investment, they mean not that 
nature is a conscious investor but that even unconscious natural processes of 
creation should be treated as investments worthy of respect.” (79)
Dworkin next addresses the question about the tragedy of the waste of 
life. He questions, although any life lost is a waste, at what point in a person's 
life is it more of a waste than another? He shows us that if life is measured in 
such a manner then the answer is incomplete. “The death of a young woman in 
an airplane crash is worse than the death of an old man would be.” (86) He 
states that this simple answer only measures life in chronological terms which 
means an early-stage abortion would be more of a frustration to the sanctity of 
life than a late-term abortion. However, most people view the death of fetuses 
differently: a late-term abortion is worse because of how much more infant-like 
the fetus has become, and likewise the death of a toddler is worse than the 
death of an infant. Unfortunately, this simple view of death only expresses the 
quantity, not the quality of life. He reminds us that we treat human life as 
intrinsically good rather than incrementally good. He believes the “simple loss” 
view “ignores the crucial truth that waste of life is often greater and more tragic 
because of what has already happened in the past.” (87) He argues that the 
death of an adolescent is worse than the death of an infant due to the 
investment that he/she and others have already made in his/her life, compared 
to that of an infant. He also states that the investment of life is from both natural 
and human means. Dworkin refers to the loss of life as a frustration of the 
investment in that life. The investment is greater as the individual grows older.
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He believes that this frustration thesis helps justify early abortions. He 
continues by stating that the frustration of life may not occur in early abortions 
since genetic individuation does not happen until fourteen days after 
conception and at implantation. “But after implantation, as fetal growth 
continues, the natural investment that would be wasted in an abortion grows 
steadily larger and more significant." (89) Dworkin furthers the issue by 
presenting the hypothesis of a couple discovering that their fetus is genetically 
deformed and that its life would be short and limited. Is it a worse frustration of 
life to end it early or for it to grow and live a crippled life? He points out that 
most people are divided about this question. Time and time again handicapped 
individuals have gone on to lead rewarding lives for themselves and others. 
Conservatives usually believe that terminating the pregnancy is a worse 
frustration, and liberals believe in some cases it is the opposite. Dworkin 
believes this difference is due to a deeper contrast between “religious and 
philosophical orientations.” (91) He shows us that how much importance 
people give to either the natural or the human investment in life will determine 
whether or not they view the deliberate premature death of a fetus as a bad 
thing. If a person perceives the natural investment as greater than any 
investment a human can make in life, then that person will believe abortion to 
be the greatest frustration of life. To the contrary, if a person believes the 
natural investment to be a minor investment as compared to the human 
investment, then abortion will not be a great frustration of life and loss of 
investment. (91) Dworkin tells us that religious (and others who hold the same 
convictions) opposition to abortion is then based on the sanctity of human life 
rather than a fetus having rights and interests. Likewise for liberals; their 
support for abortions of severely deformed fetuses is grounded in the sanctity of
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human life, preventing a great frustration of life in the form of a handicapped 
child. (92-3)
How do these now congruent beliefs come together to form an
acceptable law? Dworkin begins with an already existing law which was bom
(no pun intended) from the Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade. He argues
that the decision Justice Blackmun wrote was well founded and based on other
landmark decisions of the past. Most notable was the decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut in which the Court decided that the “state may not prohibit the sale
of contraceptives to married persons.” In later decisions to expand the sale of
contraceptives to unmarried persons Justice Brennan stated: “If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
free from governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” (106) Justice
Blackmun wrote in his decision for Roe “that a person has a specific
constitutional right to make decisions about procreation for himself or herself.”
(106) Dworkin agrees with both decisions and finds them to be good law. His
conclusion that a fetus is not a person is compatible with the Supreme Court’s
decision that a fetus is not a constitutional person. He argues that women do
have a constitutional right to privacy as implied in the Fourteenth Amendment in
decisions about procreation.
Griswold and the other privacy decisions can be justified only on the 
presumption that decisions affecting marriage and childbirth are so 
intimate and personal that people must in principle be allowed to make 
these decisions for themselves, consulting their own preferences and 
convictions, rather than having society impose its collective decision on 
them. (106)
Dworkin further argues that abortion cannot be “distinguished from 
contraception by supposing that a decision about the former is less serious; on
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the contrary, it is more.” (107) He states that some of the “safest and most 
popular contraceptives now in use-intrauterine devices and the most widely 
used birth-control pills-act as abortifacients; that is, they destroy fertilized ova if 
they fail to prevent fertilization.” (107) Dworkin holds that states cannot very 
well outlaw abortions without outlawing these contraceptives. He continues by 
stating that there is a difference between abortion and contraception, and if the 
difference is “legally relevant” then a state may have a compelling reason to 
outlaw abortions while not “banning at least some forms of contraception.” (107) 
He supports Justice Blackmun's conclusion that women have a constitutional 
right to control their role in procreation. But why should the government not be 
able to prevent women from seeking abortions since human life is sacred? Is it 
enough that women’s procreative choices are protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment?
Dworkin argues that although human life is sacred, women have the right 
to privately determine whether they will bear or beget a child. Moreover, he 
contends that this right is founded in the First Amendment’s right to the free 
exercise of religion. He holds that the belief in the sanctity of human life is 
essentially a religious conviction and women's decisions about procreation 
should therefore be protected by the First Amendment. Dworkin bases his 
argument on the character of religious beliefs as such. He establishes that such 
a belief need not presuppose a deity because some forms of Buddhism and 
Hinduism do not include worship of a deity. He continues by saying that the 
way to determine whether a belief is religious is “by asking whether it is 
sufficiently similar in content to plainly religious beliefs.” (155) He says the 
belief that human life is sacred is a religious belief held even by people who do 
not believe in God. He states that “it is, in fact, one of the most fundamental
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purposes of traditional religions to make that claim." This belief is found in the 
understanding of the First Amendment: "that a state has no business 
prescribing what people should think about the ultimate point and value of 
human life, about why life has intrinsic importance, and about how that value is 
respected or dishonored in different circumstances.” (164-5) Dworkin argues 
that "a government that makes abortion a crime denies the free exercise of 
religion as much to such women [i.e. with no religious position] as to women 
who do self-consciously draw their views about abortion from religious faith.”
(165) Dworkin concludes that the right to procreative autonomy is inherent in 
the First Amendment. He believes that it is much more important than just 
having a place in the Constitution; procreative autonomy is an important aspect 
of Western political culture, the respect for individual human dignity: "[T]hat 
people have the moral right-and the moral responsibility-to confront the most 
fundamental questions about the meaning and value of their own lives for 
themselves, answering to their own consciences and convictions.” (166)
In A Nutshell
Dworkin argues that the popular argument about abortion is mistakenly 
based on the question of whether a fetus is a person with rights and interests of 
its own. He disagrees with this framing of the argument and presents his own: 
The fetus is not a person, but people in general believe that human life in and of 
itself is intrinsically sacred. He contends that if everyone recognized this true 
nature of the abortion debate then compromise by the opposing groups would 
more easily be reached, and the decisions reached by the Supreme Court in 
Roe v. Wade regarding fetal personhood and the trimester framework would 
remain largely unchanged. This is based on the argument that since people
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believe in the sanctity of human life and that this belief is in essence a religious 
belief, it is therefore protected by the Rrst Amendment’s free exercise of religion 
clause. It is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment due to the private 
nature of procreative decisions about the very foundation of human life. He 
concludes that the procreative autonomy of women should remain protected by 
the Constitution and free from govemment intrusion prior to the sixth month of 
pregnancy.
As I stated at the beginning of this section. Dworkin’s argument is 
regarding abortion. But his reframing of the argument about fetal personhood 
into that of the sanctity of human life can also be applied to artificial 
reproduction. Some may argue that by going through the rigors of artificial 
reproduction that they have made a far greater investment in the life of the fetus 
than those who conceive unassisted. Dworkin’s arguments about the 
investment and value of human life reminded me of Heyd's argument for the 
person-affecting view because it all still boils down to how people perceive the 
value of that human life. I believe that, based on his conclusions about 
procreative autonomy and the fetus not having any interests, Dworkin would not 
be opposed to artificial reproduction. The sanctity of human life, as he argues it, 
is based on how people perceive the value of that life. He would assume that 
people considering artificial reproduction will have responsibly and morally 
deliberated about the implications of such procedures before having sought 
them. I find this troubling, but will discuss it at greater length in the next chapter.
I found his premise about how the focus should be shifted to be about the 
overall sanctity of human life, rather than fetal personhood, to be most 
convincing. This shift of focus, I believe, would compel individuals to be more 
willing to agree to discuss the current state of artificial reproductive laws, or lack
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thereof. Unfortunately, as I said above, his argument is similar to the person- 
affecting view established by Heyd. He almost adopts the attitude “if it ain’t 
broke, don't fix it” when determining that decisions regarding abortion should 
remain with women. Unfortunately, Dworkin makes broad assumptions about 
what people really think about fetal personhood. He makes his disclaimer that 
he does not mean to be arrogant, knowing more about what people think than 
they do, but he is being presumptuous. Unless he has conducted a broad study 
involving the daily deliberations of the common person, I find it hard to believe 
he is really in touch with the practices of such individuals. The average person 
is neither commonly exposed to the literature about artificial reproduction nor 
readily willing and/or able to research the material available to them as Dworkin 
is. I believe that the politicians and the activists are the ones that do deliberate 
about fetal personhood, because they are exposed to and do conduct research. 
It is these people’s voices that are more prevalent in the chambers of the 
lawmakers, but often what is ethical is not what is considered when voting on 
certain laws. I am not suggesting that all of our representatives in Congress are 
corrupt, rather that some are more concerned with what laws are more likely to 
get them re-elected. The rhetoric is heated and muddy, and I agree with his 
attempt to clarify the argument. I find his characterization of the argument most 
compelling. I agree that the argument should be more about the sanctity of 
human life, resulting in more consistent beliefs.
However, I disagree with his conclusions about abortion being protected 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. I was disappointed with his argument 
about the right to procreative autonomy. His conclusion that since some 
contraceptives act as abortifacients then abortions cannot be outlawed was 
rather weak. He made a broad leap hoping the reader would jump right along
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with him. Yes, Griswold produced a good decision, but to say without citation 
that all lUD’s and the most widely used birih control pills act as abortifacients if 
they fail to prevent the egg from being fertilized is just plain irresponsible. The 
intent of birth control is to prevent pregnancy, unlike abortion’s intent to 
terminate pregnancy. Most types of birth control pills stop ovulation, which 
prevents an egg from being fertilized. The hormone progestin prevents 
ovulation, thickens the cervical mucus, and thins the lining of the uterus making 
it next to impossible for an egg to implant. It is unknown how many times the pill 
has failed and resulted in ovulation, fertilization, and miscarriage. It is also 
unknown if the number of times this has happened is the same number of times 
an egg is naturally discharged and/or miscarried. The only birth control pill that 
is more likely to have this occur is the “mini pill". This pill contains little or no 
estrogen; it is primarily progestin. It is not commonly used due to its 
unreliability. Other forms of birth control that contain only progestin are Oepo 
Provera (a quarterly injection of progestin), Norplant (five year implant of 
progestin), and Intrauterine Devices (an eight year device containing copper 
and/br progestin). (Planned Parenthood On-line; Snider; Suarez) Dworkin’s 
claim that abortions cannot be outlawed because then contraception should be 
due to birth control sometimes failing and resulting in miscarriage is unfounded. 
He lumps these two different methods together as the same when in all actuality 
they are not. I cannot express my puzzlement that he did not research this, or if 
he did then why did he not document his findings when it is a defining premise 
to his conclusion? I can speculate that it is the birth control methods that use 
only progestin that are a higher risk of acting as an abortifacient, and that these 
forms of birth control should be investigated. However, to suggest th a t-ju s t 
because choosing a form of birth control should be free from interference by the
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govemment. then so should abortion -  does not pan out. Yes. both are 
procreative decisions, but the former is proactive and the latter reactive.
Dworkin went out on another limb by stating that since the belief in the 
sanctity of human life is essentially a religious notion, passing all of his "tests", 
then procreative autonomy should be protected by the First Amendment's free 
exercise of religion clause. The implication of allowing a notion, albeit religious, 
to qualify as an exercise of religion deserving of protection is frightening. There 
are many religious notions that could qualify as religion that would horrify some 
people. One which comes to mind is the idea of taking many wives so that men 
may be fruitful and multiply. Aside from the Asian and Arabic cultures having 
hoardes of wives, Christianity in its Jewish origins boasted the be fruitful and 
multiply belief. Abraham, Gideon and Rehoboam all had more than one wife. 
(Genesis 16; Judges 8:30; 2 Chronicles 11:23) This belief has been and still is 
shared by discreet cults. However, in the United States polygamy is against the 
law. Should we continue to let majority opinion rule even our ethics? An 
example is if a majority of men gathered and professed their belief that they 
must have more than one wife in order to multiply based on their religious 
belief, should the Supreme Court say: "Sure, be fruitful and multiply because 
we are outlawing contraception and abortion so you have no obstacles to your 
religious belief in the sanctity of human life.”
I believe that the sanctity of human life as the foundation for issues of the 
unborn needs to be further explored. It is a basis on which compromise may be 
attainable, but not with all the conclusions Dworkin offers. Unfortunately, 
however the question of the unbom is framed, we still have to conquer the 
larger issue of sexual responsibility. If people cannot have sex responsibly, 
how can we expect them to make decisions about abortion and artificial
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reproduction responsibly? Dworkin presumes that people do deliberate 
extensively about their beliefs of the sanctity of human life in regards to 
decisions about the unbom. However, it seems evident that if people really did 
take a moral journey about how sacred human life is, then I sincerely doubt they 
would be so careless about having sex and making babies. He does, though, 
shift the focus of the question away from fetal rights and personhood to the more 
proper question of the sanctity of human life. With the focus shifted, we now can 
address the idea that if we were all to believe that life in and of itself is truly 
sacred then any activity that could potentially cause harm or destroy a human 
life would be a direct violation of that belief. If a person uses a certain form of 
birth control and it fails they should still keep the child, because by consenting 
to have sex already commits them to the responsibility of the consequences of 
their actions regardless of contraceptive success. Further, any such activity is 
the result of selfish, human irresponsibility. The next chapter will explore a 
common belief that society as a whole needs to take a more proactive stance in 
helping its citizens in becoming more responsible. Each of the authors agree 
that society has some responsibility to encourage respect for 
sexual/reproductive decisions. This concept of encouraging responsible 
behavior can be the basis for creating initial policy consensus, and then 
advancing the discussion of more contentious issues.
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CHAPTER 6 
REPRODUCTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
The fact is, if you have sex there is a good chance pregnancy may occur. 
This can happen if birth control is used, if your tubes are tied, if you were really 
careful. I am not denying the fact that whatever the consequences of sexual 
intercourse may be, people still have sex. A long time ago the risk of pregnancy 
acted as somewhat of a deterrent, but with the advent of birth control, sex 
became less of a taboo. Then with the legalization of abortion, sex became an 
act of freedom over one's body. Even with the outbreak of herpes and AIDS, 
people still have sex. Regardless of the circumstances, people will continue to 
have sex.
Technology has delivered a lot of easy fixes to the obstacles of sex and 
procreation. Birth control, abortions, and infertility drugs can all be obtained. 
Unfortunately, what has resulted is an attitude and law that everyone has a right 
to have sex and procreate as they please, regardless of the consequences to 
themselves and others (including the unbom). If you become pregnant and do 
not want the baby you can get an abortion. If you are infertile you can take all 
sorts of drugs and produce a lot of embryos in hopes that at least one of them 
will implant in your uterus before flushing them out. Or you can just freeze your 
embryos until you are ready for implantation. If your fetus has developed signs 
of possible genetic deformity you can either risk the life of the fetus and undergo 
genetic therapy in uterine, or abort it and try again. This type of behavior is not
89
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solely that of some Individuals; society and govemment as a whole foster it. Is it 
society's responsibility to educate its citizens in hopes of their becoming more 
sexually responsible? Or is sexual behavior purely an individual responsibility? 
If human life is not sacred then it will not matter how individuals behave 
sexually. But, if the notion of the sanctity of human life is to be accepted 
universally, then so should the idea that irresponsible sex and procreation 
denies the fetus that sacredness. To assume that people do forego any 
individual motives in order to preserve the respect for life a fetus deserves 
means that we all live in Utopia. Unfortunately, we do not and people usually 
think more of themselves than they do of human life. The following chapter will 
explore what Raymond, Tribe, Heyd, the Roman Catholic Church, and Dworkin 
think about where the primary responsibility lies. In addition, Mary Ann 
Glendon's work in Rights Talk will be useful in shedding some light on why 
people regard responsibility in the manner they do.
Responsibility
Raymond argues that most women do not have control over their own 
bodies; therefore how can they be held responsible for their actions? She says 
that reproduction is sexual and women cannot control their sexuality “because 
they cannot say no, because they have sex forced on them, because they are 
girls held hostage and made pregnant by families where fathers, brothers, or 
male relatives use them sexually, because teenagers who have sex but do not 
know why.. . “ (xxv) It is these types of conditions, she continues, that pave the 
way for reproductive technological sexual abuse of women. Raymond stresses 
that technological reproduction is part of sexual politics, allowing further access 
by men to women's bodies “for medical research and experimentation, for
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financial gain, for clinical experience and adventure, for the manipulation of
life." (xxv) She argues that our society does not support women who choose
not to be wives and mothers and that "no technology of birth control or abortion,
no amount of education about sexuality, no juggling of family roles to
accommodate working mothers will ever give women control of their bodies and
lives." (74) Raymond says that all too often money is spent on developing
reproductive technologies for the few people who have the means to obtain
them rather than on preventing maternal morbidity and infant mortality. She
stresses that social responsibility should be in ensuring “basic access to
nutrition, sanitation, prenatal care.and prevention of disease." (137)
Tribe believes that women are ultimately responsible for their sexuality,
but that they are influenced by external factors. Instead of placing obstacles in
the way of women having children, he says that we should “encourage people
to want children by making it easier for them to care for infants once they are
born. Affordable postnatal health care and mandatory maternity and paternity
leaves would be a beginning." (211 ) Tribe says that other services such as
reliable child care and flex-time arrangements at the office would help women
in deciding in favor of having children. He continues by pointing out that
women/girls are not well educated about the various forms and availability of
birth control. He gives an example showing that government-controlled sex
education and birih control can work.
In Sweden a law was enacted in 1974 that was designed to increase the 
use of birth control in order to reduce the rate of abortion. This law put 
into place an aggressive program of birih control education and provided 
for reductions in the cost of contraceptives. The result has been a sharp 
decrease in the rate of both teenage pregnancy and abortion in Sweden. 
(212)
Tribe stresses, though, that it is still up to women to decide to use birth control.
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The govemment cannot force it upon them. For those who believe that birth
control condones premarital sex and that non-procreative sex is immoral. Tribe
believes that they would find birth control better than abortion. (213) He also
explores the possibility of an artificial womb in the future becoming a solution to
unwanted pregnancies. Women who do not want to be pregnant because of
circumstances or fetal deformities can have their fetus placed in an artificial
womb for gestation and then later adoption. However, as Tribe points out, many
women would not consider this a choice for the same reason they do not bear
the child themselves and then place it for adoption - they do not want their own
unaccepted child in the world. (213-14, 220-21) Although women ultimately
bear the responsibility. Tribe concludes that society in general needs to be
more responsible for the attitudes it conveys regarding pregnancy, and the
programs it provides for pre- and postnatal care.
Better education, the provision of contraception, indeed the creation of a 
society in which the burden of raising a child is lighter, are all achievable 
goals. . .  nearly all of us already agree that we should strive for a society 
in which every child a woman conceives is wanted and in which every 
child bom has someone to love and nurture it. (228)
Heyd uses a different approach to responsibility. He looks at it as the 
issue of “licensing parents," which is the controversy between an interest in 
having children and the public good. He points out that although being a parent 
is usually a natural right, it is society that is responsible for the care of a child 
that is bom handicapped or to parents who are incapable of caring for it. He 
shows us that if govemment were to begin requiring children be bom without 
handicaps and with certain physical and mental characteristics the implications 
would be far reaching. Licensing is not for the welfare of the child, but to 
prevent the burden such children would impose on society by the “irresponsible
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reproductive behavior of the parents " (157) Heyd argues that if the licensing of
natural parents is repugnant, then why would it be acceptable in artificial
parenthood? While Heyd opposes the licensing of parents altogether, he sees
the necessity of encouraging parents to be more responsible. As he already
established, the unborn child has no interest or right in being bom healthy, and
regulation would only be for the benefit of society wanting to control the
outcome of a pregnancy due to artificial reproduction. He stresses that
government cannot prevent people from artificially conceiving a child if early
tests reveal a genetic disease. That decision must remain with the parents.
Heyd states that society should attempt to influence reproductive responsibility
through education, the creation and accessibility to health care facilities, and
other means to ensure a public good. He believes that this type of social
intervention will help people in Ihe  balancing of the deeply respected intimacy
of reproductive choices by individual couples and the burden to society." (158)
The Roman Catholic Church also recognizes that women are not alone
in the decision making process regarding their unborn children. Pope John
Paul II wrote that women are influenced not only by their family members, and
the nurses and doctors they consult, but also by the govemment which allows
such procedures to remain legal.
A general and no less serious responsibility lies with those who have 
encouraged the spread of an attitude of sexual permissiveness and a 
lack of esteem for motherhood, and with those who should have 
ensured-but did not-effective family and social policies in support of 
families, especially larger families and those with particular financial and 
educational needs. (694)
He charges that decisions made about artificial reproduction are not the sole 
responsibility of the individual; it is a problem which exists at the cultural, social 
and political levels. It is at these levels where Pope John Paul II says the crimes
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against life are interpreted as "legitimate expressions of individual freedom." 
(692) He argues that ethical relativism is at the base of the problem. He 
disagrees with those who believe that such relativism is necessary for 
democracy because it guarantees tolerance, mutual respect for others, and 
acceptance of mgyority decisions. He stresses that democracy "cannot be 
idolized to the point of making it a substitute for morality or a panacea for 
immorality." (695) Pope John Paul II believes that for the future of society and 
democracy to flourish, education about the value of and respect for human life is 
absolutely necessary. The trivialization of sexuality, he says, is among the main 
factors which has led to the disrespect for new life. He argues that the only way 
to protect new life is through education of adolescents and young adults about 
sexuality and love, involving "training in chastity as a virtue which fosters 
personal maturity and makes one capable of respecting the ‘spousal’ meaning 
of the body." (695)
According to Dworkin, the idea that society has a "legitimate concern" in 
protecting the sanctity of human life "by requiring its members to acknowledge 
the intrinsic value of human life in their individual decisions" could mean that 
the goal of govemment is either responsibility or conformity. (150) He says that 
if the government were aiming for its citizens to be responsible for decisions 
regarding the unborn it would be because of hoping they would understand the 
moral importance of such decisions, and that they will have deeply reflected on 
their choice rather than making an impulsive decision. However, if the 
government's goal were for its citizens to conform to what the majority believes 
to be In the best interest of everyone then the government demands they "act in 
a way that might be contrary to their own moral convictions." which does not 
permit individuals to grow and develop their own beliefs about the sanctity of
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human life. (150-1 ) He continues by telling us that the current laws do allow for 
individuals to make their own decisions about life responsibly. Dworkin argues 
that govemment should have a stake in encouraging its citizens to treat matters 
of life as of "serious moral importance", but that it should not cross the line and 
coerce its citizens in making their decisions in a certain way congruous to a 
majority opinion. "It is perfectly consistent to insist that states have no power to 
impose on their citizens a particular view of how and why life is sacred, and yet 
also to insist that states do have the power to encourage their citizens to treat 
the question of abortion seriously." (153)
So, who is to take responsibility? It appears that all of the authors 
considered here agree that government should take some responsibility, but 
how much and in what form seems to be the biggest controversy. They all 
touched on how it is the individual woman's ultimate responsibility to make the 
decision since she alone will act, but none assigned autonomous responsibility 
to her in that she is and will be affected by external factors. This is perplexing 
especially when Raymond, Tribe, Heyd and Dworkin believe the decision is 
hers and hers alone and the govemment should not intervene, yet they want 
govemment to intervene in what services are provided to her during and after 
the pregnancy. I agree that society affects how decisions regarding 
reproduction will be made and that certain attitudes and programs need to be 
redefined, but I disagree with the view that people should be given ultimate 
control over decisions about their unborn children, how they are conceived and 
disposed of. It is precisely at these times when logic seems to fly out the 
window. Emotions take control regardless of how much people believe they are 
thinking clearly. I believe that it is a minority that actually do critically examine 
the implications of their actions in such situations before acting, and that it is a
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majority who look for the quick fixes to their procreative problems. Yet, how can 
government establish one ethic of responsibility without completely imposing on 
reproductive liberties? What would that ethic be?
Ethic of Responsibility
It seems that our society has developed an ethic of what "I" am not 
responsible for, rather than what "I” should be responsible for. Unfortunately, 
this ethic is so embedded in American ideology that it appears next to 
impossible to change. How did society become so responsibility-averse? Mary 
Ann Glendon believes that it is due to decades of conditioning by lawyers and 
law-makers separating morals from rights and laws. In her book. Rights Talk. 
she discusses how legal terminology about rights has pervaded everyday 
speech, resulting in a society formed by individuals concerned with their "rights" 
to the point of virtually eclipsing moral responsibilities and duties. People are 
so absolute about what their rights are, she says, that it is difficult to discern 
between actual rights and wants and desires. "The exaggerated absoluteness 
of our American rights rhetoric is closely bound up with its other distinctive 
traits-a near-silence concerning responsibility, and a tendency to envision the 
rights-bearer as a lone autonomous individual." (45) Glendon gives the 
example of people who, in the face of a law prohibiting them from doing what 
they feel is their right, say: "It’s my body and I have the right to do as I please 
with it." Unfortunately, all too often it is these people whose actions end up 
adversely affecting themselves and others. Glendon is puzzled how in the face 
of such facts that "our rhetoric of rights so often shuts out relationship and 
responsibility, along with reality?” (46)
Glendon argues that legal discourse is in large part responsible for
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society being more concerned with individual rights than responsibilities. This 
is evident in laws about "procreation, family relations and child raising." (73)
She tells us that the United States lags behind other countries in providing for 
family assistance. European countries make provisions for the family, and treat 
the individual as having a social dimension in the larger picture of the family as 
a fundamental social unit. Glendon stresses that in our society of 
"hyperindividualism" it is of little surprise that the neediest people are the ones 
most neglected. This is the result of such people as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
and others who shaped American laws by embracing the notion of individual 
autonomy. She says that by "ignoring or downgrading healthy forms of 
interdependence, they have distanced legal-and therefore, political-discourse 
from the everyday lives of most Americans.” (75) Glendon tells us that buried in 
our rights dialect is the presumption that people have "no obligations toward 
others except to avoid the active infliction of harm.” (77) She supports this 
charge with the Supreme Court decision in DeShanev v. Winnebago Countv 
Department of Social Services which stated that the Constitution does not 
obligate govemment or govemment employees to help "distressed” people, 
"even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty or property 
interests of which the govemment itself may not deprive the individual.” (77)
She tells us, though, that this is due to legal education in America over the past 
century distinguishing between law and morality. Glendon does say that law 
should not be the "energetic civic schoolteacher” but that it should be more 
cognizant of its effects on society. (85) However, many Americans see laws as 
interpretations of morals and values. If laws are nonexistent regarding 
responsibilities, Americans may perceive this absence as a license to act 
irresponsibly. (87) She argues that if the United States were to place both
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individual and social responsibilities in the forefront as European countries do. 
then its citizens would likely follow suit. Glendon stresses that she does not 
mean our Constitution should be amended to be more like European laws, but 
that by observing their use of legal rhetoric in the public marketplace we could 
minimize the clash between rights and responsibility. (101)
In the area of family policy, Glendon shows us that govemment needs to 
be more supportive. Two-income households are more the norm than they 
used to be, she says, and govemment must recognize the impact policies have 
on families. She urges govemment to help men and women more with the 
responsibilities they have to each other and their families. "At a minimum, we 
must be attentive to the ways in which governmental or employer policies may 
inadvertently be discouraging, impeding, or even penalizing those who are 
responsibly trying to carry out family roles.” (135) But she stresses that it has to 
be a partnership between government and families that will repair social 
relationships and foster responsibility.
Glendon acknowledges that without the cooperation of all people, 
individuals are powerless to achieve such goals by themselves. "If American 
society already is producing too many individuals who are incapable of 
responsible parenthood, or of sustaining personal relationships, or of 
participating in civic life, it is rather late to worry about the state of our political 
discourse.” (135) She urges, though, that in order to alter the course of society 
"reasoned processes of deliberation" are needed to bridge the gap between 
rights and responsibilities. Glendon believes that this deliberation cannot occur 
solely between average citizens, but the people In positions of leadership must 
act as role models and actively "create opportunities for discussion." She 
continues by saying deliberation requires "time, information, and forums where
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facts, interests, and ideas can be exchanged and debated " (179) The 
discussion cannot be a political debate with its only goal to be for one party to 
gain voters over another. Glendon fears that people do not believe each other 
to be capable of respecting the "rights of others even at the cost of some 
disadvantages to one's self, the ability to defer some immediate benefits for the 
sake of long-range goals, and a regard for reason-giving and civility in public 
discourse." (179) Unfortunately, there are many conditions and situations in 
society that support her fears. Child and spousal abuse, political and religious 
scandals, she says, all deteriorate any trust that people may have in being 
protected from the "arbitrary exercise of public or private power.” (182)
Therefore, until rights talk can be removed from daily discourse it will be difficult, 
almost impossible, for governments to work with its citizens to forge an ideal of 
responsibility. "Only time will tell whether the public square can be effectively 
regained for an ongoing broad-based conversation about the means and ends 
of government, about what kind of society we are, and about what kind of future 
we hope to create for our children and for posterity.” (182)
Responsibility versus Right
One theme rings throughout the messages of the authors examined; 
government needs to provide services and encourage a society to be more 
receptive to the needs of families. Only Glendon, though, indicated that 
government needs to work together with its citizens to be able to accomplish a 
more responsible society as a whole. Our govemment cannot do it alone. It 
cannot come down on its citizens like some tyrannical power and force us to 
conform to its new laws regardless of what they may be. If Glendon’s argument 
is correct that part of the problem with our society is that rights talk has invaded
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so much of what we do daily, causing us to be more concerned with what we 
are not required by law to do rather than what we should do responsibly and 
morally, can decades of conditioning be altered? It seems that individualism 
has conquered our nation, leaving ideals about a functioning society of 
democracy as a mere facade. I agree with Qlendon’s fears that people do not 
trust one another to critically reason about societal concerns, let alone personal 
dilemmas. She states that she does not believe our govemment should fashion 
policy by imitating European countries’ laws. It seems though, that she does 
think we could leam something from them because she periodically compares 
our laws, or lack thereof, to those of certain European countries. She also 
points out that what makes America distinct and special, its diversity, is what will 
help it get through this era of individualism. I agree. The "Great American 
Melting-Pot” is what gave our country its strength to become a nation of power 
based on the collective goals of different races, religions and both sexes. It is 
the combined ideologies of these various groups which has fostered a greater 
understanding of human characteristics allowing for our ethical growth as a 
country. Yes, we do still have a lot of leaming to do, but we need to regroup 
and that is exactly what our country does in times of crisis.
Applying her argument to that of artificial reproduction appears to be 
quite worthwhile. Our society has become completely engulfed in what we 
believe to be our inalienable right to procreate how and with what we please. 
Individualism pervades procreation in all forms. Government does need to 
establish programs and policies that effectively educate women, teens, and 
preteens about the consequences of having sex. Government needs to reform 
Its current adoption system so that infertile couples can easily adopt unwanted 
children. We as a society should take responsibility for our current and future
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State of affairs and approve new taxes needed to fund and support these 
programs. We as individuals need to take responsibility for our own procreative 
actions. We cannot continue to recklessly have sex without taking responsibility 
for the consequences. All too often abortion is used as a form of birth control, 
and it cannot continue as an easily available option for preventing unwanted 
pregnancies. This attitude of being able to dispose of whatever we do not want 
perpetuates the irresponsibility of people, especially in regards to sex and 
children. We need to become more responsible about having children; 
sacrificing many embryos for the sake of possibly having one implant is a gross 
violation of the respect for human life. Sacrificing the many for the sake of the 
few is a selfish act of anyone regardless of how much that inidividual may value 
the few. You cannot respect life and discard so much of it in one act just to 
satisfy a supposed need to have a biological child. There are many unwanted 
children in the world who need a loving family; these children, together with the 
disposed embryos, are sacrificed for the sake of one individual attempting to 
have one biological child. With improved adoption laws, people insistent on 
being a parent should adopt orphaned children. It should not matter if it is 
biologically "yours". Being a parent is about supporting and nurturing your 
child, not yusf continuing the blood line. We as a country need to grow up. We 
have become so dependent on our rights, we have lost sight of our 
responsibilities to ourselves and others. We cannot function as a society if we 
continue to exist in a "l-me-my" shell. Our notion of responsibility is chock full of 
ulterior motives to satisfy personal wants and desires. “I want to have sex, but 
do not want to have children." "I want to have children, but not someone else's, 
unless of course I can bear someone else's embryo to at least make me feel like 
it is really mine." We need to be responsible enough to realize we cannot allow
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the continued commodification of human life. We need to find a solution to the 
sexual irresponsibility that is running rampant in our society before it climaxes. 
We need to be responsible.
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION
In light of the information presented in the preceding chapters is it 
necessary to alter the current course of new reproductive technologies? I say 
yes, due in large part to the recent cloning of a sheep which has opened the 
ultimate question of cloning humans. There seems to be no end to some 
Individuals’ desire to completely control human reproduction whether it be 
through artificial reproduction or complete cloning. I find it truly astonishing that 
no one has addressed the ethics of such a thing before recent events of this 
nature. In November 1993, an article appeared in the Las Veoas Review- 
Journal citing experiments already being conducted in the cloning of humans 
as well as animals. These experiments took place at George Washington 
University in which its human cloning experiments failed. “But the embryos 
mysteriously died very soon after cloning. They shriveled up well before they 
could develop even the first cell of the true embryo -  the part destined to 
become the fetus.” However, according to the article “embryo splitting works in 
farm animals, and since the early 1980s thousands of cattle, sheep, pigs and 
rabbits have been bom from cloned embryos." (Rensberger 8F) Obviously, 
scientists have been toying with this idea for quite some time. It is a short step 
between the cloning of a human being and the mass production of human 
fetuses. Yes, cloning is the exact replication of a human being and 
cryopreservation is the freezing of several individual human beings; however,
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the results are the same. The respect for human life is often disregarded in 
favor of the commodification of human beings. Much like the process of 
Inserting several embryos in hope of at least one implanting, several humans 
would be left on the cutting-room floor, so to speak, in order to perfect the 
process of cloning humans. Is one process better than the other? No. Both 
treat human beings as a means to others’ selfish ends. Society cannot continue 
to allow people to use human beings as guinea pigs to make a profit such as 
the selling of embryos. Our govemment has said that federal funds cannot be 
used for human cloning experiments; unfortunately, there are many individuals 
with the money to fund such experiments if they deem it beneficial to 
themselves. If from this study we agree that the ultimate goal is to increase the 
respect for and the recognition of the sanctity of human life, then we must take a 
much stronger stance against any techniques which clearly violate this respect 
for human life. Which leads us to the primary focus of this thesis - the 
irresponsibility of human beings toward human beings.
I have established that individuals in our soceity often abuse the notion of 
what their human rights are, and choose to behave responsibly and morally 
consistent only when it benefits them. So, if as a society we are to try to change 
the very foundation from which we reason through the question of reproduction, 
then a policy of responsibility must be both established and enforced in order 
for It to work. This policy would be the result of individuals from all walks of life 
contributing to a forum on the respect for human life. They would first agree that 
the goal is to develop in people the knowledge necessary to grasp the meaning 
behind the respect for the sanctity of human life. Second, they would agree to 
bring to the table only those arguments which would benefit a proactive policy 
rather than information which would disrupt such as utilizing only those
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
105
arguments which provoke hatred and violence. Third, they would agree that 
such a policy could take as many as ten years (more or less) to be brought to 
fruition. And fourth, many people would have to be disciplined for not 
complying with such a policy. Such a policy could follow a framework such as 
this:
1 ) Sanctity of Human Life Programs; Mandatory education 
beginning In elementary schools teaching children about the respect for human 
life. Teaching them that this knowledge and respect incorporates, yet transends 
any and all secular and non-secular beliefs. Contributions from all factions will 
be needed in order to have unbiased educational material. Mass media 
campaign to educate adults as to the implications of using NRT’s. That human 
beings regardless if pre-bom, bom or dead are not to be commodified. The 
implementation of town hall meetings chaired by government leaders, various 
experts, and community leaders to discuss the importance of respect toward 
human life.
2) Sex Education Programs: Mandatory education beginning in 
elementary schools teaching children about sex, various forms of birth control, 
and abstinence. This will be taught in a matter-of-fact style while recognizing 
that depending on the child’s age the level of material that will be taught.
Parents and guardians will be welcome to attend these classes. A multi-media 
saturation campaign supported by the government to educate young adults and 
adults alike about the implications of their sexual and reproductive activities.
3) Parental Support Programs: The inception of more effective 
adoption services and contraceptive/family planning sen/ices allowing 
individuals to not fear the birth of a child. The development of parental support 
groups, such as a type of big brother, big sister program to single parents to
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help them cope with and manage their children, personal lives, work lives and 
finances. Increased support in taxes, child support and health insurance by 
governmental budgetary cuts and/brtax increases.
4) Artificial Reproduction Regulatory Policy: After the inception of 
these programs laws will have been passed that will punish those who violate 
the policy developed to protect the unborn. This policy will include laws 
regulating and/or banning such procedures as, but not limited to, abortions, 
surrogacy, SET, IVF, cryopreservation, and the selling or giving of embryos. 
(Variations of these procedures which help save the life of a fetus will have to 
be explored further and will likely take more time to distinguish which 
procedures will be cosmetic in nature versus ethically therapeutic.) This policy 
will promote the equitable treatment of pregnant women, single or married, in 
the workplace and community. It will encourage the ideology that all human life 
should be respected and encouraged regardless of race, sex, disability, etc.
Such programs would be funded and supported by our government 
through new taxes or the diversion of existing taxes. We as a society must be 
responsible for the monetary costs of these programs as well as the moral costs. 
If we agree to protect the sanctity of human life, then we must be prepared to 
contribute to that goal. The above framework may seem too stringent and it 
needs indepth evaluation and contributions by those who research and forge 
policies daily. But, it also needs the contribution of those who are not included 
in the day-to-day lawmaking; this type of policy needs the Involvement and 
commitment of those who will be affected by the policy. Everyone needs to 
know they participated in its inception through implementation in order for the 
policy to be complied with willingly. Some may reject this policy in part or 
completely, but through discourse I believe that the goal of respect for the
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sanctity of human life is achievable on a massive scale.
In this thesis I have presented the information available to me during my 
research on the technologies, the philosophies, and the laws regarding NRT’s.
I have shared my ideas as to how these things are beneficial and where they 
are flawed. I have also suggested an example for a solution via a policy. What 
is needed is an end to the continued irresponsible and selfish behavior of 
Individuals regarding abortion, artificial reproduction, and now cloning. The toll 
on human life is too great; morally our lives are suffering and physically the lives 
of many are wasted.
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way fer reproductive technofogicaf sexual aisuss of women. Ravmcnd stresses 
that technological reproducnon is part of sexual pcOtfcs, aïov/ing furthar access 
by men to women's iscdies for medical research and exnerimentaticn, for 
financial gain, fcr clinical experience and adventure, for the manipulation of 
life." (xxv) She argues that oiS" society does not support woman who choose 
not to be wives and mothers and that 'no tachnoicgy of birth central or abortion, 
no amount of education about sexuality, no juggling of family roles to 
accommodate working mothers wiii ever give women contre! of the?' bodies and , 
lives '̂ (74) Raymond says that ail too often money is spent on developing ' 
reproductive technologies for the few people who have the means to obtain 
them rather than on preventing maternal morbidity and infant mortality. She 
stresses that social responsibôity should be in ensuring "basio access to 
nutrition, sanitation, prenatal cars.and prevention of disease.’ (137j
Tribe believes that women are ultimately responsible for their sexuaiity, 
but tfîstthay ers influenced by sxtemaf factors. Instead cf placing obstacles In 
the way of women having children, he says that we should 'encourage people 
to ivanf children by mWring it easier for them to care for infants once they are 
bora Affordable postnatd health care and mandatory maternity and paternity 
leaves would be a beginning." (2t t) Tribe says that other services such as 
reliable child care and flex-time arrangements at the office would help women 
in deciding in favor cf having children. He continues by pointing cut that 
v/omen/guls are not m l educated about the various forms and availability of 
birth control. He gives an example shov/ing that govemment-oontrollad sex
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